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Abstract 
∎ If the EU wants to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, enacting conventional 
climate change mitigation measures to avoid emissions of greenhouse 
gases will not be enough. To compensate for unavoidable residual emis-
sions, unconventional measures to remove CO2 from the atmosphere will 
also be necessary – for example, through afforestation or the direct cap-
ture of CO2 from ambient air. 
∎ Not all member states and economic sectors will have achieved green-
house gas neutrality by 2050; some will already need to be below zero by 
then. The option of CO2 removal from the atmosphere will allow greater 
flexibility in climate policy, but will also raise new distributional issues. 
∎ Avoiding greenhouse gas emissions should be given political priority over 
the subsequent removal of CO2. Net zero targets should be explicitly divided 
into emission reduction targets and removal targets, instead of simply off-
setting the effects of both approaches. 
∎ The future development of an EU CO2 removal policy should be structured 
by adequate policy design. Whether the EU chooses a proactive or cautious 
entry pathway in the medium term will depend not least on the net nega-
tive targets it assumes for the period after 2050. 
∎ In the coming years, the EU should focus on investing more in research 
and development of CO2 removal methods and gaining more practical 
experience in their use. 
∎ Only if the EU and its members actually succeed in convincingly combin-
ing conventional emission reductions and unconventional CO2 removals to reach 
net zero will the EU be able to live up to its status as a pioneer in climate 
policy. 
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Issues and Conclusions 
Unconventional Mitigation: 
Carbon Dioxide Removal as a New 
Approach in EU Climate Policy 
The European Union (EU) sees itself as a pioneer in 
international climate policy, basing its actions on 
the latest scientific findings. Following the tightening 
of the long-term temperature goal in the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, the results of the latest Special Reports of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and 
the protests of the Fridays for Future movement, the 
EU has raised its greenhouse gas reduction target for 
2050: from 80–95 percent to net zero emissions. How-
ever, not all emission sources can be completely elimi-
nated by 2050. In particular, aviation, certain indus-
trial sectors and agriculture are likely to continue to 
contribute residual emissions beyond the middle of the 
century. To bring the overall balance to zero, it will 
therefore not be sufficient to take conventional climate 
change mitigation measures to avoid emissions. The 
EU will also have to implement unconventional meas-
ures for the targeted removal of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
from the atmosphere – to the amount of several 
hundred million tonnes per year. 
Up until now, the removal of atmospheric CO2 
has played only a minor part in the EU climate policy 
debate. This is partly due to the state of develop-
ment of the relevant methods. Apart from the already 
established option of re/afforestation, methods for 
CO2 removal such as the combination of bio-energy 
and carbon capture and storage, increased carbon 
sequestration in soils, or the direct capture of CO2 
from ambient air have been insufficiently researched 
or are not yet at the stage of market maturity. How-
ever, the fact that the carbon removal approach has 
considerable potential for causing irritation is much 
more significant. This applies not only to the prob-
lem-solving paradigm prevalent in EU climate policy, 
but also to the associated narrative whereby science-
based emission reduction targets and support for low-
carbon technologies contribute to stabilising the global 
climate system while generating “green growth” in 
Europe. The future debate will therefore not only 
focus on evaluating specific methods, but also on 
the conceptual role of the carbon removal approach. 
This study investigates the question of how the cur-
rently still unconventional carbon removal approach 
Issues and Conclusions 
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can be integrated into EU climate policy. The answer 
depends not only on the technological and economic 
potentials of each method, but also on the assessment 
of central actors as to who, under a shifting paradigm, 
would have more responsibility for achieving the 
European climate mitigation goals, and who would 
have less. 
The debate will be significantly shaped by the fact 
that not all member states and sectors need to have 
achieved greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050. Those 
with a high proportion of residual emissions, unfa-
vourable economic conditions or above-average nego-
tiating power will voice their expectation that there 
will continue to be both leaders and laggards in EU 
climate policy. This could mean, for example, that 
countries such as Poland or Ireland would be allowed 
to have their emissions above the zero line in 2050, 
while pioneers such as Germany, France or Sweden 
would be called upon to reduce their emissions 
already by more than 100 percent, i.e. to remove more 
CO2 from the atmosphere than they still emit. 
It is difficult to anticipate which path the EU will 
choose in the coming decade to start deliberately 
removing CO2, and what part the relevant methods 
will play in EU climate policy in the long term. There-
fore, it would be premature to draw up very detailed 
regulatory proposals at this point. In its drafts for 
an EU climate strategy 2050 and an EU climate law, 
the Commission has indeed begun to give significant 
attention to CO2 removal. However, which member 
states, party groups, economic sectors, companies, and 
NGOs want to promote the removal approach, and 
which methods they prefer, is only beginning to 
emerge. 
Anticipated political resistance will be directed 
at the removal approach itself, not only because of 
the distributional effects described above, but also 
because of fears that it could call conventional miti-
gation measures into question. However, there will 
also be resistance to individual methods, usually 
based on specific risk perceptions and presumably 
occurring along the already established dividing line 
between ecosystem-based and technological removal 
methods. 
The EU’s climate policy must be expanded, and for 
this to be successful, it must prioritise avoiding green-
house gas emissions over the subsequent removal of 
CO2. Moreover, the impression that individual mem-
ber states and sectors benefit disproportionately from 
the conceptual integration of CO2 removal should be 
avoided. Two steps are of particular importance here: 
devising the specifics of net zero targets and designing 
the policy. 
To safeguard the primacy of conventional mitiga-
tion measures and to communicate them visibly, it is 
advisable to split net zero targets into emission reduc-
tion targets and removal targets, instead of offsetting 
the effects of both approaches, i.e. in the order of 
90:10 percent. If the 90 percent was understood to be 
the minimum target, breakthroughs in CO2 removal 
methods would not lead to a decrease in emission 
reductions, but to net zero or net negative emissions being 
achieved earlier. 
The relationship between leaders and laggards 
should also be regulated at an early stage. If, for un-
derstandable reasons, individual countries and sectors 
reach the zero line later than the EU average, that 
difference should at least be limited in time or cor-
relate with financial compensation. The EU should 
not allow any member state to reach net zero more 
than 10-15 years later than the average. As for the 
relationship between sectors, however, it will not be 
possible in the foreseeable future to establish a simi-
lar obligation; there are technical feasibility limits 
in agriculture, in particular. Here, it is important to 
ensure that sectors which have to be allowed residual 
emissions as a matter of principle are themselves 
responsible for CO2 removals, regardless of whether 
they purchase certificates from other sectors or invest 
directly in CO2 removal methods. 
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Mitigation of anthropogenic climate change requires 
the concentration of carbon dioxide and other green-
house gases (GHG) in the atmosphere to be stabilised. 
This can be achieved in two fundamental ways. Inter-
national climate policy has always focused on emis-
sion sources and thus on the avoidance of greenhouse 
gas emissions, for example from the power sector, 
industry, transport, or land-use changes. 
To achieve global climate goals, 
methods for the removal of 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere 
must be used. 
However, there has also always been a second 
strand of climate change mitigation policy, which 
focuses on the preservation and enhancement of 
emission sinks, i.e. the removal of carbon dioxide 
(CO2
1) from the atmosphere, for example through 
programmes for re- or afforestation or the restoration 
of ecosystems. Since global emissions of greenhouse 
gases have continued to rise almost continuously 
since the adoption of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the 
conventional mitigation approach, which is aimed at 
avoiding emissions, has lost nothing of its urgency – 
quite the contrary. However, to achieve the global 
climate targets adopted by the UNFCCC, unconventional 
mitigation methods involving the deliberate removal 
of CO2 from the atmosphere
2 must also be used, and 
 
1 Methods of removing other greenhouse gases (such as 
methane, nitrous oxide or F-gases) from the atmosphere have 
so far hardly featured in the debate. 
2 As much as possible, we avoid the term negative emissions 
in this study, because it often leads to misunderstandings, 
especially due to an implicit equation with the term net nega-
tive emissions. The latter describes a status (globally, or in a 
subsystem such as the EU, a country, sector or company) 
where more CO2 is removed from the atmosphere than is 
still emitted in greenhouse gases. The fact that CO2 removal 
to a considerable extent. There is now a broad con-
sensus on this in climate research.3 This can be 
achieved not only by enhancing the sink function 
of ecosystems, but also using technological processes 
such as the direct capture of CO2 from ambient air, 
whereby the CO2 is subsequently geologically stored. 
The capture and storage of CO2 (Carbon Capture and 
Storage, CCS) from the use of fossil fuels in power 
plants or in industrial processes is a conventional 
mitigation method because the stored CO2 has not 
been taken from the atmosphere.4 The approach of 
large-scale CO2 removal has been discussed in climate 
science since the beginning of the millennium and, 
over the past decade, has become an integral part of 
the mitigation scenarios assessed by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The scenarios 
in the IPCC Special Report on the 1.5 degree target are 
based on the removal of vast quantities of CO2 (Car-
bon Dioxide Removal, CDR) – 730 billion tonnes (giga-
tonnes, Gt) by 2100, almost 15 times the current 
annual GHG emissions.5 Yet the issue of CDR has still 
gained only marginal importance both on the global 
climate policy agenda and in debates within the sig-
natory states of the Paris Agreement. Moreover, given 
 
methods are used does not in itself indicate whether total 
net emissions are above, below or exactly at zero. 
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global 
Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Green-
house Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the 
Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Deve-
lopment, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (Geneva, 2018). 
4 Jan C. Minx et al., “Negative Emissions – Part 1: Research 
Landscape and Synthesis”, Environmental Research Letters 13, 
no. 063001 (2018); Sabine Fuss et al., “Negative Emissions – 
Part 2: Costs, Potentials and Side Effects”, Environmental 
Research Letters 13, no. 063002 (2018). 
5 Joeri Rogelj et al., “Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 
1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development”, in IPCC, 
Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report (see note 3), 122. 
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the current state of research and development, it is 
uncertain how great the potential of individual CDR 
methods actually is and how quickly they could be 
deployed at scale.6 
CO2 Removal in Climate Policy 
The necessity to remove carbon from the atmosphere 
stems from two different functional logics. First, by 
generating net negative emissions,7 CDR theoretically 
makes it possible to compensate at a later point in 
time for initially overshooting the CO2 budget that 
the world has left to reach a given temperature tar-
get.8 Second, CDR is already needed to achieve net 
zero emissions, since not all GHG emissions can be 
completely eliminated, be it for technological, eco-
nomic or political reasons. Since the remaining 
carbon budget for the lower end of the Paris Agree-
ment target corridor of 1.5 to 2°C is much smaller 
than for the upper end, 1.5°C compatible emission 
pathways reach net zero much earlier than pathways 
compatible with 2°C (see Figure 1). 
In the political debate on carbon removal, the fact 
that it compensates for an interim overshooting of 
the CO2 budget has so far been foregrounded. For 
critics, what is problematic is not only the vast CDR 
volumes assumed by mitigation scenarios, and the 
unintended negative side effects that individual 
methods might have when implemented, but above 
all that the CDR-enabled possibility of achieving net 
negative emissions masks the fundamental contradic-
 
6 Gregory F. Nemet et al., “Negative Emissions – Part 3: 
Innovation and Upscaling”, Environmental Research Letters 13, 
no. 063003(2018): 1–30. 
7 Due to the very small remaining CO2 budget, all illustra-
tive model pathways in the IPCC Special Report on the 1.5 °C  
target assume that net negative emissions must be achieved 
in the second half of the century. 
8 Due to the roughly linear relationship between the 
cumulative amount of CO2 emissions and the global average 
temperature increase, each temperature target can be con-
verted into a remaining CO2 budget. Since the 5
th
 Assessment 
Report of the IPCC (2013/14), the (remaining) carbon budget 
has been considered a central category in climate research 
and climate policy, see Joeri Rogelj et al., “Estimating and 
Tracking the Remaining Carbon Budget for Stringent Climate 
Targets”, Nature 571 (2019): 335–42; Bård Lahn, “A History 
of the Global Carbon Budget”, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 
[WIREs]: Climate Change 11, no. e636 (2020). 
tion between a limited CO2 budget and real-world 
emissions that continue to rise.9 
Nobody fundamentally doubts that 
there are unavoidable emission 
sources which will have to be 
balanced by sinks. 
More attention has recently been paid to the use 
of CDR to offset residual emissions (mainly methane and 
nitrous oxide from agriculture and CO2 from indus-
trial processes and aviation), especially within global 
or national net zero targets, which are becoming 
increasingly popular in climate policy.10 One reason 
for this is the Paris Agreement, Article 4 of which 
explicitly includes the target “to achieve a balance 
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second 
half of this century”11 – which would at least stabi-
lise global temperature.12 
 
9 Oliver Geden, Modifying the 2°C Target. Climate Policy 
Objectives in the Contested Terrain of Scientific Policy Ad-
vice, Political Preferences, and Rising Emissions, SWP 
Research Paper 5/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, June 2013); Oliver Geden, “Climate Advisers Must 
Maintain Integrity”, Nature 521 (2015): 27–28; Kevin Ander-
son and Glen Peters, “The Trouble with Negative Emissions”, 
Science 354, no. 6309 (2016): 182–83; European Academies 
Science Advisory Council (EASAC), Negative Emission Technolo-
gies: What Role in Meeting Paris Agreement Targets? (Halle: EASAC, 
February 2018); Alice Larkin et al., “What if Negative Emis-
sion Technologies Fail at Scale? Implications of the Paris 
Agreement for Big Emitting Nations”, Climate Policy 18, no. 6 
(2018): 690–714; Nils Markusson, Duncan McLaren, David 
Tyfield, “Towards a Cultural Political Economy of Mitigation 
Deterrence by Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs)”, 
Global Sustainability 1, no. E10 (2018): 1–9. 
10 Oliver Geden, “An Actionable Climate Target”, Nature 
Geoscience 9 (2016): 340–42; Steve Pye et al., “Achieving Net-
zero Emissions through the Reframing of UK National Tar-
gets in the post-Paris Agreement Era”, Nature Energy 2, no. 3 
(2017): 17024; United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), The Emissions Gap Report 2019 (Nairobi, November 
2019). 
11 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 12 Decem-
ber 2015. 
12 Jan S. Fuglestvedt et al., “Implications of Possible Inter-
pretations of ‘Greenhouse Gas Balance’ in the Paris Agree-
ment”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Series A, 
Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences 376, no. 2119 
(2018): 1–17. 
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CO2 Removal in Climate Policy
Since the publication of the IPCC Special Report on 
the 1.5-degree target, it has also become increasingly 
apparent that nation states, cities and companies 
are each discussing and deciding on individual net 
zero targets.13 As a result, the compensatory func-
tion of CO2 removal is increasingly coming into focus. 
Although the level of residual emissions assumed 
in global and national climate mitigation scenarios 
is certainly the subject of criticism,14 no one in the 
debate fundamentally doubts that there are unavoid-
able emission sources which will have to be balanced 
by sinks. This puts the spotlight on the question of 
which CDR methods could be used in the future. 
 
 
13 See for example the Energy & Climate Intelligence 
Unit’s Net Zero Tracker. For examples in the context of 
UNFCCC negotiations, see Stefan C. Aykut et al., The Account-
ant, the Admonisher and the Animator: Global Climate Governance 
in Transition, (Hamburg: Center for Sustainable Society 
Research, February 2020). 
14 Duncan P. McLaren et al., “Beyond ‘Net-Zero’: A Case 
for Separate Targets for Emissions Reduction and Negative 
Emissions”, Frontiers in Climate 1, no. 4 (2019): 1–5. 
Selected CO2 Removal Methods 
In global mitigation scenarios, two main removal 
methods have so far been used: afforestation and, 
to a far greater extent, the use of biomass for energy 
generation in combination with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS). This limitation to two methods is 
mainly due to pragmatic considerations in climate-
economic modelling and existing gaps in knowledge. 
However, the range of possible CO2 removal methods 
is much wider. Should the CDR volumes assumed 
in global mitigation scenarios ever be realised, we 
should not expect it to happen with a (globally co-
ordinated) recourse to only two methods. Since many 
methods are still in an early phase of research and 
development, estimates of removal potentials and 
costs are subject to great uncertainty. Furthermore, 
each method could be applied in several variants. The 
actual use of removal methods in individual countries 
will depend not only on their effectiveness and cost, 
Figure 1 
 
 
Source: Committee on Climate Change (CCC), Net Zero – The UK’s Contribution to Stopping Global Warming (London, 2019), 77, 
based on IPCC SR1.5 scenario database 
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but also on the different geographical conditions, eco-
nomic structures and political preferences.15 
Numerous studies on CO2 removal methods have 
been published in recent years with the aim of pool-
ing the existing body of knowledge and identifying 
gaps in research.16 We will provide a brief overview of 
the research results on the most important methods 
below. Our focus is on those factors that are likely to 
significantly shape or influence the political debate 
on further research, the launch of pilot projects, and 
the large-scale deployment of the various methods. 
These criteria include the methods’ specific function-
al mechanisms, availability, global removal poten-
tials, cost, permanence of CO2 storage, and possible 
risks.17 
Re/Afforestation 
In this approach, CO2 from the atmosphere is cap-
tured in wood biomass through photosynthesis by 
the planned expansion of forest areas on land that 
has not been covered by trees during the last 50 years 
(afforestation) or on more recently deforested land 
(reforestation). Since the extraction potential of a 
forest decreases significantly in the long term (satu-
ration), the age of tree stands and the available land 
areas are of great importance. The additional global 
CO2 removal potential is estimated to be 0.5–3.6 Gt 
CO2 in 2050. This can be increased by long-term use 
of the harvested wood, for example as building ma-
 
15 Rob Bellamy and Oliver Geden, “Govern CO2 Removal 
from the Ground Up”, Nature Geoscience 12, no. 11 (2019): 
874–76. 
16 Pete Smith et al., “Biophysical and Economic Limits 
to Negative CO2 Emissions”, Nature Climate Change 6, no. 1 
(2016): 42–50; UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2017 (Nairobi, 
November 2017); Fuss et al., “Negative Emissions – Part 2” 
(see note 4); Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineer-
ing, Greenhouse Gas Removal, London 2018; Gernot Klepper and 
Daniela Thrän, Biomasse im Spannungsfeld zwischen Energie- und 
Klimapolitik. Potenziale – Technologien – Zielkonflikte (Munich, 
2019); Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Climate En-
gineering and Our Climate Targets – A Long-overdue Debate, Schwer-
punktprogramm 1689 (Bonn, 2019); International Energy 
Agency (IEA), Energy Technology Perspectives 2020: Special Report 
on Clean Energy Innovation (Paris 2020; forthcoming); other 
methods discussed in the literature include restoring peat-
lands and marine habitats, burial of biomass, and use of CO2 
in durable materials such as carbon fibre composites. 
17 Estimates for removal potentials and costs have so far 
been carried out almost exclusively at global level; no EU-
specific data are available. 
terial. The cost estimates for 2050 are $5–50 per 
tonne of CO2 removed.
18 
Forests cannot be fully protected against natural 
and human disturbances such as drought, pests and 
fire.19 The permanent storage of the extracted CO2 is 
therefore highly uncertain. Negative side effects in-
clude high land and water use, a possible reduction 
in biodiversity (depending on how the respective land 
use changes), and reduced reflection of solar radiation 
(albedo) in forest areas at northern latitudes. Affor-
estation and reforestation are already established as 
methods for CO2 removal. 
Soil Carbon Sequestration 
The soil organic carbon content can be increased 
in various ways, including by changing agricultural 
practices, such as refraining from deep ploughing, 
incorporating harvest residues or sowing cover crops. 
The removal potential is 2–5 Gt CO2. However, it is 
limited by the medium to long-term carbon satura-
tion of the soil. The costs are estimated at $0–100 
per tonne of CO2. 
Permanence of CO2 storage is quite uncertain. It 
depends inter alia on how the land is managed or 
used in the long term. Positive side effects of increas-
ing the soil carbon content are improvements in 
capacity for water and nutrient retention and increases 
in soil fertility. Land-use conflicts are not expected, 
since agricultural use of respective soils could con-
tinue despite the increased CO2 enrichment. Methods 
for increasing carbon sequestration in soils could be 
applied immediately. 
Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (BECCS) 
BECCS combines energy production from fast-growing 
biomass with capture and storage of the resulting 
CO2. Since biomass takes up CO2 from the atmosphere 
during its growth, the combination of both processes 
is equivalent to a net removal of CO2. The potential 
 
18 The values for all methods given in this study are an-
nually realisable values. Like the cost estimates (in 2011 
US dollars), they always refer to the year 2050. These data are 
taken from a comprehensive meta-study that evaluates over 
2,000 articles, see Fuss et al., “Negative Emissions – Part 2” 
(see note 4). 
19 On a global scale, land use and forestry are currently 
still emission sources, i.e. they emit more CO2 than is bound 
by re/afforestation (see Figure 1, p. 9). 
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of BECCS is estimated at 0.5–5 Gt CO2. The amount 
depends on the availability of sustainably produced 
biomass whose cultivation competes with other uses. 
The estimated cost per tonne of CO2 extracted is 
$100–200. 
The removal can be made permanent by storing 
the CO2 geologically underground. A positive side-
effect of BECCS is that, unlike most other removal 
methods, it generates energy (electricity, biofuels 
or hydrogen). A disadvantage is that the necessary 
cultivation of biomass is land-intensive (but less per 
negative tonne of CO2 than afforestation), requires 
water and fertiliser, and thus potentially conflicts 
with food production and biodiversity more than 
most other removal methods. The individual com-
ponents of the process, energy generation from 
biomass and CCS, are each considered sufficiently 
researched and tested. So far, the two sub-processes 
have only been combined in a single commercial 
plant (for biofuel production, in the US); two dem-
onstration plants in the power and in the heating 
sector were commissioned in the UK and Sweden in 
2019. To use BECCS on a large scale in the future, 
infrastructures for the transport and storage of the 
captured CO2 would also have to be created. 
Biochar 
The heating of biomass, for example plant residues, 
in the absence of oxygen prevents the organic ma-
terial from decomposition and thus from releasing 
CO2. Biochar produced in this process can be mixed 
into arable soils. The potential of biochar as a CO2 
removal option is about 0.5–2 Gt CO2. The cost per 
tonne of CO2 is estimated at $30–120. 
Depending on the process chosen, the production 
of biochar offers the possibility of storing CO2 in a 
stable way for several centuries. Land-use conflicts 
over biomass can be limited by recycling plant waste. 
Using biochar as a soil amendment also has a positive 
effect on the quality of soils. Producing and burying 
biochar is already practiced, but only to a very limited 
extent due to the lack of specific incentive systems. 
There is a lack of experience with large-scale plants 
and the corresponding production and supply chains 
for biomass. 
Direct Air Carbon Capture and 
Storage (DACCS) 
CO2 can also be filtered from ambient air by chemical 
processes (Direct Air Capture, DAC) and then stored 
underground. The potential of DACCS is in principle 
unlimited. Since not much land is required for DAC 
systems, any number of units could theoretically be 
put into operation, as long as they are in relative prox-
imity to established geological CO2 storage facilities. 
The potential of this method is limited by the large 
amounts of energy it requires – which would have 
to be supplied from low-CO2 sources – as well as the 
location and volume of global storage capacities. Due 
to the small number and size of the facilities built so 
far, development of DAC technology is far from com-
plete. Upscaling production capacities can therefore 
be expected to reduce costs significantly, down to 
$100–300 by the middle of the century. 
The first DAC plants are being operated in Switzer-
land, Italy, Iceland, the USA and Canada. For eco-
nomic reasons, the captured CO2 has so far usually 
not been stored underground but used further (car-
bon capture and utilisation, CCU), for example in the 
beverage industry or in the production of synthetic 
fuels. If CO2-free energy sources are used, these DAC 
projects are at best greenhouse gas neutral, since the 
CO2 is emitted again when the products are used. To 
permanently remove CO2 from the atmosphere with 
DAC, it will have to be permanently stored. 
Enhanced Weathering on Land and 
in the Ocean 
This procedure accelerates natural CO2-binding pro-
cesses in the weathering of minerals. Carbonate and 
silicate rocks are mined, ground and spread over 
agricultural land or ocean surfaces. By the middle of 
the century, the method’s potential is estimated to be 
2–4 Gt CO2, at $50–200 per tonne of CO2 removed. 
Compared to other removal methods, the negative 
side effects are considered to be low. The distribution 
of the ground rock on agricultural land would not 
cause any conflicts of use and could contribute to 
improving soil quality. Spreading the ground rock 
in oceans could counteract increasing acidification. 
However, for large-scale use, an extensive infrastruc-
ture for the extraction, transport and application of 
the minerals would have to be created. Specific pro-
cesses of enhanced weathering have not yet been 
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sufficiently researched experimentally and are there-
fore not yet ready for use. 
Ocean Fertilisation 
This method aims to increase the nutrient content 
of the ocean, preferably by adding iron. This would 
encourage plankton growth, which in turn would 
bind more atmospheric CO2. Estimates of the future 
removal potential and associated costs are subject to 
much greater uncertainty than with other methods. 
How permanently the removed CO2 could be stored 
is a controversial issue, since only a small part of 
the additionally absorbed CO2 would be stored in sea 
floor sediment. So far, two negative side effects are 
known. There is a fundamental risk of over-fertili-
sation, which could result in strong plankton blooms 
withdrawing a great deal of oxygen from the affected 
ocean areas. Over-fertilisation would also lead to an 
increase in nitrous oxide, which would run counter 
to the goal of removing greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere. Due to its negative side effects, the ex-
tent of which is almost impossible to estimate, and 
its low efficiency as a CO2 removal method, ocean 
fertilisation is now rarely treated as a serious option 
in research. 
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The global emission reduction scenarios assessed by 
the IPCC, which outline compliance with the target 
corridor agreed in Paris (1.5–2°C), include extra-
ordinarily large quantities of CO2 removal from the 
atmosphere. However, with the exception of the 
United Kingdom, no UNFCCC Party has yet made 
serious efforts to develop a comprehensive CDR 
research and demonstration programme, or dedicated 
regulatory instruments. Following the latest IPCC 
Special Reports on the 1.5°C target and on Climate 
Change and Land, it is now generally accepted by 
policymakers and public officials that using CDR will 
be essential if the Paris long-term temperature goal is 
to be met. So far, however, the UNFCCC has avoided 
a serious debate about which methods, and above all 
which actors, should generate the corresponding 
amounts of CO2 removal.
20 
The experience of past international climate nego-
tiations suggests that the EU could take a leading role 
on CDR. The European Union is still the third largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases in the world; Europe has 
a high degree of historical responsibility for climate 
change; and the EU constantly emphasises its leader-
ship within the global climate regime.21 Climate-eco-
nomic models for global emission reductions assume 
that the EU will be one of the largest “producers” of 
CDR in the 21st century, contributing about 50 Gt – 
more than 10 times its current emissions but at the 
 
20 Mathias Fridahl, “Socio-political Prioritization of Bio-
energy with Carbon Capture and Storage”, Energy Policy 104 
(2017): 89–99; Glen P. Peters and Oliver Geden, “Catalysing 
a Political Shift from Low to Negative Carbon”, Nature Climate 
Change 7, no. 9 (2017): 619–21; Mathias Fridahl and Mariliis 
Lehtveer, “Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage 
(BECCS): Global Potential, Investment Preferences, and De-
ployment Barriers”, Energy Research & Social Science 42 (2018): 
155–65. 
21 Lisanne Groen and Sebastian Oberthür, “The European 
Union and the Paris Agreement: Leader, Mediator, or By-
stander?” WIREs Climate Change 8, no. 1 (2017): e445. 
same time less than 10 percent of the total global CDR 
volume.22 These numbers would increase substantial-
ly if criteria of international fairness were applied.23 If 
the global community is to achieve net negative emis-
sions on the way to meeting the Paris target corridor, 
the EU will have to set itself long-term emission reduc-
tion targets of more than 100 percent. But so far, the 
removal of atmospheric CO2 has only played a minor 
part in the EU’s climate policy debate. 
An Irritation to the EU’s 
Climate Policy Paradigm 
Although the EU has committed itself to a science-
based climate policy, its reluctance to date on the 
subject of CO2 removal should not come as a surprise. 
Plans for transforming economic sectors and actual 
restructuring processes – for example of national 
energy systems – do not usually follow the optimisa-
tion assumptions of complex global mitigation sce-
narios. To assess how the (unconventional) approach of 
CO2 removal from the atmosphere could be integrated 
into European climate policy, we must not only ex-
amine how CDR fits into existing political preferences, 
economic interests and national infrastructures. It is 
equally important to analyse how the new approach 
relates to the climate policy paradigm that is pre-
valent in Europe. In the last two decades, this para-
digm has been characterised by a narrative that 
science-based targets for emission reductions and the 
 
22 Peters and Geden, “Catalysing a Political Shift from Low 
to Negative Carbon” (see note 20); Naomi E. Vaughan et al., 
“Evaluating the Use of Biomass Energy with Carbon Capture 
and Storage in Low Emission Scenarios”, Environmental Re-
search Letters 13, no. 4 (2018): 044014. 
23 Carlos Pozo et al., “Equity in Allocating Carbon Dioxide 
Removal Quotas”, Nature Climate Change 10 (2020): doi: 
10.1038/s41558-020-0802-4. 
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promotion of climate-friendly technologies would 
help to stabilise the global climate system whilst 
generating “green growth” in Europe.24 
This cognitive problem-solving model, shared by 
the main EU actors,25 has been relatively stable for at 
least two decades, and the instruments created for it 
have accordingly achieved a high degree of institu-
tionalisation. The central actors in this policy domain 
(European Commission and member states in North-
Western Europe) are also among the most influential 
forces in the EU as a whole. At the same time, over 
the past ten years the veto power of Poland and the 
Visegrád Group has weakened noticeably. Not least 
because the Green Growth Group of climate-progressive 
member states is increasingly willing to use the op-
portunity for qualified majority decisions in the 
Council, no longer seeking consensus on every fun-
damental question by delegating decisions to the 
European Council.26 The European Parliament (EP) 
has also accrued greater weight in the legislative 
procedures since 2014. 
CDR holds considerable potential for 
becoming an irritation to Europe’s 
climate success story. 
EU climate policy is polycentrically organised27 and 
has been supported by a broad constellation of actors 
beyond the EU institutions for more than 20 years. 
This includes a comparatively environmentally 
friendly population and powerful non-governmental 
 
24 Vivian Scott and Oliver Geden, “The Challenge of Car-
bon Dioxide Removal for EU Policy-Making”, Nature Energy 3, 
no. 5 (2018): 350–52. 
25 Marcus Carson, Tom Burns and Dolores Calvo, eds., 
Paradigms in Public Policy. Theory and Practice of Paradigm Shifts 
in the EU (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012). 
26 E.g. in negotiations on the reform of emissions trading, 
see Torbjørg Jevnaker and Jørgen Wettestad, “Ratcheting 
Up Carbon Trade: The Politics of Reforming EU Emissions 
Trading”, Global Environmental Politics 17, no. 2 (2017): 105–
24. The possibility of using qualified majority voting changes 
the balance of power in the Council of the EU to the detri-
ment of potential veto users, even if consensus decisions are 
ultimately reached, see Stéphanie Novak, “The Silence of 
Ministers: Consensus and Blame Avoidance in the Council 
of the European Union”, Journal of Common Market Studies 51, 
no. 6 (2013): 1091–1107. 
27 Tim Rayner and Andrew Jordan, “The European Union: 
The Polycentric Climate Policy Leader?” WIREs Climate Change 
4, no. 2 (2013): 75–90. 
organisations (NGOs), allowing scientists a strong role 
in policy formulation, and relying on companies that 
invest massively in low-carbon technologies. More-
over, there are now hardly any relevant actors who 
fundamentally reject an ambitious climate policy. 
Energy-intensive industry, for example, no longer 
questions ambitious long-term targets per se. Its criti-
cism is usually limited to questioning the scope of 
their planned contribution to achieving these targets. 
Despite fears to the contrary ahead of the 2019 Euro-
pean elections, and in contrast to the US or Australia, 
even climate change deniers have so far failed to 
exert any significant political influence in the EU; 
there is thus no competing paradigm or powerful 
climate policy counter-narrative in the EU.28 
It is hard to deny that the EU’s climate policy ap-
proach has been comparatively successful in the past. 
Emissions already fell by more than 20 percent be-
tween 1990 and 2018,29 putting the EU far ahead of 
Western industrialised countries and legitimising 
its claim to being a leader in international climate 
policy.30 Since there is a broad interest within the EU 
in continuing this European success story – not least 
in order to counteract the rampant perception of an 
EU that is shaken by crisis or has only a limited capac-
ity to act – climate policy actors tend to be risk-averse. 
Debating how to systematically remove atmospheric 
 
28 It is true that right-wing populist parties in Europe 
have recently increasingly incorporated elements of climate 
change scepticism into their communication. However, 
the issue is not central to their agenda. It merely serves to 
emphasise their anti-elitism. Here, the difference between 
the EP and the Council of the European Union is remarka-
ble. The representatives of right-wing populist parties, who 
are usually marginalised in the Parliament, often express 
strong climate change denial (see Stella Schaller and Alexan-
der Carius, Convenient Truths. Mapping Climate Agendas of Right-
wing Populist Parties in Europe (Berlin: adelphi, 2019). However, 
when representatives of these parties become part of mem-
ber states’ governments (e.g. the PiS in Poland or, until 2019, 
the FPÖ in Austria), they do not stand out in the Council of 
the European Union with climate-sceptical positions. 
29 The latest available statistics for 2018 show a reduction 
of 23.3 percent for the EU28. With the United Kingdom 
leaving the EU, the relative performance of the EU27 de-
creased by about 3 percentage points due to the above-
average emission reductions of the UK since 1990, see Euro-
pean Environment Agency (EEA), Trends and Projections in 
Europe 2019: Tracking Progress towards Europe’s Climate and 
Energy Targets (Copenhagen, 2019). 
30 Groen and Oberthür, “The European Union and the 
Paris Agreement” (see note 21). 
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CO2 does not directly call into question the dominant 
paradigm, which is geared to avoiding dangerous cli-
mate change caused by anthropogenic emissions; how-
ever, CDR has considerable potential for becoming an 
irritation to Europe’s climate policy success story. 
If the EU suddenly acknowledges the need to 
remove CO2 from the atmosphere on a large scale, 
including net negative emissions in the long-term, 
this is tantamount to admitting that there have been 
fundamental failures in (largely EU-driven) global 
climate policy which cannot be compensated for by 
conventional mitigation measures alone. The EU may 
be able to defend its domestic climate policy record 
against the impression of failure. But this raises the 
question of why the EU in particular should bear the 
burden of becoming an international pioneer in CDR. 
Would this simply be an expression of its global 
political responsibility, or could Europe’s economies 
also benefit from an unconventional climate policy 
approach, at least in the long term? It is highly doubt-
ful that comprehensive EU programmes for CO2 re-
moval methods such as BECCS and re/afforestation 
would be able to fulfil the promise of positive side 
effects that are closely linked to current climate policy 
(e.g. “green” growth, more jobs, improved local air 
quality, and reduced dependence on energy imports). 
One decisive factor in determining whether and 
how the concept of deliberate CO2 removal will be 
integrated into EU climate policy is likely to be 
the patterns of interpreting CDR, which will shape 
the mitigation debate in the medium term. Such 
influence, which should not be underestimated, will 
come from the status of CDR in future UNFCCC nego-
tiations; from (perceived) experiences with CDR pro-
grammes and methods in other G20 countries; from 
the role of CO2 removal in IPCC scenarios; and last 
but not least from the positioning of European en-
vironmental NGOs and companies. Will CDR pri-
marily be seen as a fit-for-purpose response to climate 
change, as a meaningful extension of the existing 
climate policy portfolio, and possibly even as an im-
plementation of the precautionary principle which is 
often invoked in European environmental policy in 
the sense of forward-looking risk management? Or 
will the approach of removing atmospheric CO2 be 
interpreted as undermining an ambitious mitigation 
policy, and as a dubious attempt to postpone neces-
sary emission reductions further into the future in 
the vague hope that future generations will find new 
technical solutions?31 Such assessments would not, of 
course, develop in a political or societal vacuum. New 
ways of describing problems or approaching solutions 
will always have an impact on the relevance of pre-
viously used policy instruments or on the relation-
ships between the actors concerned.32 For this reason, 
the issue of which groups of actors would be ascribed 
more responsibility to achieve Europe’s climate pro-
tection targets under a shifting paradigm, and which 
ones less, will be a central factor in the considerations 
of governments, climate policymakers, industry asso-
ciations, businesses, and NGOs. 
Normalising the CO2 Removal Approach 
With the exception of forestry measures,33 European 
climate policy cannot rely on mature CDR methods, 
making it hard to assess how much their implemen-
tation would cost and who would benefit from their 
use. As with global debates, the European debate will 
initially focus on conceptual aspects of CO2 removal 
and only at a later stage on specific methods, i.e. 
initially far more on questions of “why” and “how 
much” than on “how”. 
 
31 Michael Obersteiner et al., “How to Spend a Dwindl-
ing Greenhouse Gas Budget”, Nature Climate Change 8 (2018): 
7–10; Nils Markusson, Duncan McLaren and David Tyfield, 
“Towards a Cultural Political Economy of Mitigation Deter-
rence by Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs)”, Global 
Sustainability 1, no. E20 (2018): 1–9. 
32 David Béland and Michael Howlett, “How Solutions 
Chase Problems: Instrument Constituencies in the Policy 
Process”, Governance 29, no. 3 (2016): 393–409. 
33 Since 2000, the EU28 has achieved an average net CO2 
removal of 0.32 Gt per year in the emission category Land-
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), with a slight 
downward trend. Although this net sink is equivalent to 
roughly 5 percent of 1990 EU emissions, it has so far not 
been included in the calculation of the EU emission reduc-
tion target (20 percent from 1990 to 2020). In the coming 
regulatory phase (2021–2030), this will be possible for 
the first time, but only to a very limited extent, see Hannes 
Böttcher et al., EU LULUCF Regulation Explained. Summary of Core 
Provisions and Expected Effects (Freiburg: Öko-Institut, June 2019). 
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A serious discussion on the need for 
net negative emissions has not yet taken 
place at the EU level. 
The fact that a debate on CDR has not taken place 
in the EU and among its member states is also due to 
the fact that Europe was late in adapting its emission 
reduction targets to the IPCC’s global mitigation sce-
narios. The EU reduction target of 80–95 percent by 
2050, which was adopted by the European Council 
in 2009, drew its political legitimacy from an explicit 
reference to a table in the 4th IPCC Assessment Report 
of 2007, which presented 80–95 percent as an ap-
propriate contribution from industrialised countries. 
As the 5th IPCC Assessment Report in 2013 did not 
include such a table, there was no subsequent dis-
cussion in the EU about adjusting the 2050 climate 
target.34 This only changed after the Paris Agreement. 
While European NGOs initially argued that the estab-
lishment of a global 1.5°C target would require the 
EU to tighten its reduction target to 95 percent, the 
IPCC Special Report 2018 established a new type of 
target which has quickly become the benchmark for 
all climate policy actors in industrialised countries: 
net zero emissions or greenhouse gas neutrality.35 In the 
public debate, individual countries, cities, sectors and 
businesses are now differentiated based on the year 
by which they should achieve net zero. But the IPCC 
now restricts itself to giving global averages, not dis-
tinguishing between groups of countries so as not to 
pre-empt genuine political negotiations. For there 
to be at least a 50 percent chance of stabilising global 
warming at 1.5 degrees by 2100, GHG emissions 
would have to reach net zero by 2067 (and CO2 emis-
sions, which are easier to reduce, by 2050) – and 
 
34 Brigitte Knopf and Oliver Geden, “A Warning from 
the IPCC: the EU 2030’s Climate Target Cannot Be Based 
on Science Alone”, energypost.eu, 26 June 2014, https:// 
energypost.eu/warning-ipcc-eu-2030s-climate-target-based-
science-alone/ (accessed 7 February 2020). 
35 Even though the two terms are often used synonymous-
ly, greenhouse gas neutrality cannot be simply equated with 
the (broader) concept of climate neutrality. This distinction 
becomes politically relevant, for example, in aviation, where 
the climate impacts of long-haul flights at high altitudes go 
beyond GHG emissions, see Jan S. Fuglestvedt et al., “Impli-
cations of Possible Interpretations of ‘Greenhouse Gas Bal-
ance’ in the Paris Agreement” (see note 12); Lisa Bock and 
Ulrike Burkhardt, “Contrail Cirrus Radiative Forcing for 
Future Air Traffic”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 19, no. 12 
(2019): 8163–74. 
then move deep into “negative territory”.36 The EU 
Commission and member states deduce from the IPCC 
figures that the EU should have achieved greenhouse 
gas neutrality by 2050 (see Figure 1, p. 9, and Table 1, 
p. 16).37 However, the majority of European NGOs are 
calling for a GHG-neutral EU by 2040 at the latest. No 
serious debate on the need for Europe to achieve net 
negative emissions thereafter has yet taken place at the 
EU level – even though the Regulation on the Gov-
ernance of the Energy Union already includes it as a 
long-term option.38 
 
36 James Meadowcroft, “Exploring Negative Territory Car-
bon Dioxide Removal and Climate Policy Initiatives”, Climatic 
Change 118, no. 1 (2013): 137–49. 
37 This has so far been reflected in all key documents from 
EU institutions: in the Commission’s draft for the EU’s long-
term climate strategy of November 2018; in the Commis-
sion’s Communication on the European Green Deal of De-
cember 2019; in the European Council conclusions presented 
the following day; in the Commission’s draft for an EU cli-
mate change law presented in March 2020; and in the EU’s 
long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC by the Council 
and the Commission shortly afterwards. 
38 Article 15 of the Regulation states, albeit in a somewhat 
convoluted form, that the binding obligation to establish 
national and EU long-term strategies serves to achieve “long-
term greenhouse gas emission reductions and enhancements 
of removals by sinks in all sectors […] so as to achieve a bal-
ance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and re-
movals by sinks of greenhouse gases within the Union as 
early as possible and, as appropriate, achieve negative emis-
Table 1 
Target years for achieving net zero emissions 
 Only CO2 
(global,  
IPCC SR1.5i) 
All GHG 
(global,  
IPCC SR1.5i) 
All GHG 
(EU, 
Commissionii) 
 1,5°C 2050 2067 2050 
 2°C 2070–2085 after 2100 ca. 2060iii 
 
i Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. (see note 3), Table 2.4. 
ii European Commission, In-Depth Analysis in Support of the 
COM(2018) 773 (Brussels, 28 November 2018). 
iii This value is based on an extrapolation of the emission 
reduction pathway of 80–95 percent by 2050. 
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The fact that the climate policy debate is refocus-
ing on net zero targets has a (largely unintended) side 
effect: CO2 removal is beginning to normalise. While 
an 80–95 percent target could certainly be achieved 
without CDR, this becomes impossible with a reduc-
tion target of 100 percent – whatever the target year 
(see Figure 1, p. 9). All climate policy actors (including 
environmental NGOs) accept in principle that even in 
a greenhouse gas-neutral EU there will still be resid-
ual emission sources that cannot be eliminated or can 
only be eliminated at very high costs – for example 
in agriculture, the steel and cement industry, or avia-
tion.39 These residual emissions can only be physically 
compensated by using CO2 removal methods.
40 
New Rules, Similar Game 
Not only will the implementation of a net zero target 
result in a Europe-wide tightening of climate policy 
 
sions thereafter”, see Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Govern-
ance of the Energy Union and Climate Action. 
39 David Gernaat et al., “Understanding the Contribution 
of Non-carbon Dioxide Gases in Deep Mitigation Scenarios”, 
Global Environmental Change 33 (2015): 142–53; Steven J. 
Davis et al., “Net-zero Emissions Energy Systems”, Science 360 
(2018): eaas9793; Gunnar Luderer et al., “Residual Fossil CO2 
Emissions in 1.5–2°C Pathways”, Nature Climate Change 8 
(2018): 626–33; Julio Friedman et al., Low-Carbon Heat Solu-
tions for Heavy Industry: sources, options, and costs today. (New 
York: Columbia/SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy, Octo-
ber 2019); Christopher G. F. Bataille, “Physical and Policy 
Pathways to Net-zero Emissions Industry”, WIREs Climate 
Change 11, no. 2 (2020): e633. 
40 Compensating for residual emissions, at least on the 
balance sheet, would also be conceivable for the time being 
if European governments and companies were once again 
allowed to use credits from international mitigation projects 
to meet their legal emission reduction obligations. In the EU 
this is no longer possible due to the negative experience with 
such mechanisms, which were laid down in the Kyoto Proto-
col. A change in offsetting policy will only be decided in the 
EU after a successful conclusion of the negotiations on inter-
national market mechanisms provided for in the Paris Agree-
ment (Article 6). If such project-based credits are once again 
accessible to actors within the EU, a considerable part will 
come from the use of CDR methods, not least from re/affor-
estation projects, see Matthias Honegger and David Reiner, 
“The Political Economy of Negative Emissions Technologies: 
Consequences for International Policy Design”, Climate Policy 
18, no. 3 (2018): 306–21. 
targets, the normalisation of CO2 removal will also 
create a new resource for flexibility. Net zero will for 
the first time put the focus of climate policy on all 
sectors and member states, including politically asser-
tive sectors such as agriculture, or member states 
with very low per capita income such as Bulgaria and 
Romania. All emitters will come under increased 
pressure to justify their actions, even those that pre-
viously implicitly assumed that their greenhouse gas 
emissions would fall largely into the 5–20 percent 
that an EU reduction target of 80–95 percent by 2050 
would leave. Yet the net zero target will also accelerate 
a debate on the nature and extent of residual emis-
sions, and their compensation through deliberate CO2 
removals. Many governments, industries and com-
panies, which are under increasing pressure to change 
in order to achieve ever more ambitious emission 
reduction targets, will initially see CDR primarily as 
a new resource for political flexibility, without neces-
sarily planning to use CDR themselves. At the same 
time, a gradually developing political and economic 
demand for CDR will also attract potential CDR sup-
pliers who are confident that they can exploit the 
arising market opportunities. 
CO2 removal from the 
atmosphere will expand the field of 
climate policy. 
The integration of CDR into a programme to 
achieve a net zero target will thus not be accompa-
nied by a fundamental paradigm change in EU cli-
mate policy, nor will it lead to fundamental changes 
in the interaction between key players.41 However, 
CO2 removal from the atmosphere will expand the 
field of climate policy by increasing the number of 
variables. Once the concept of deliberate removal of 
CO2 from the atmosphere has become normalised, 
it raises immediate questions of convergence and 
equity, primarily between member states and be-
tween emission sectors or industries: who will be 
allowed to stay above the zero line for longer or even 
permanently? Who will organise CO2 removals, and 
who will pay for them? 
 
41 Due to the much larger CDR volumes, EU climate policy 
would be under far greater pressure to change in the event 
of a comprehensive, but currently not pursued, net negative 
strategy, see Oliver Geden, Glen P. Peters and Vivian Scott, 
“Targeting Carbon Dioxide Removal in the European Union”, 
Climate Policy 19, no. 4 (2019): 487–94. 
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If CO2 removal makes it possible to compensate for 
residual emissions so as to achieve net zero emissions, 
then it is obviously also conceivable that individual 
states or sectors (for example those with a low pro-
portion of residual emissions or favourable conditions 
for the use of CDR methods) will remove significantly 
more CO2 from the atmosphere than they still emit. 
This actor-specific net negative option would give 
other countries or sectors (such as those with a high 
proportion of residual emissions, unfavourable con-
ditions for the use of CDR methods, or difficult eco-
nomic conditions) the option of not (yet) having to 
reduce their emissions by 100 percent as part of an 
EU-wide net zero GHG emissions target.42 When the 
European Council first adopted the climate neutrality 
target for 2050 in December 2019, Poland thus pushed 
through the formulation that “One Member State, at 
this stage, cannot commit to implement this objective 
as far as it is concerned”.43 
In publishing its draft EU climate change law, the 
Commission has taken this position into account by 
not proposing that all member states must be climate-
neutral by 2050, but by defining climate neutrality as 
a target “at Union level” to be achieved by the EU as a 
whole.44 These clauses, which are not easy to interpret 
for the general public interested in climate policy, 
allow the progressive member states of the Green 
Growth Group to evade, for the time being, the ques-
tion of whether they are prepared to commit them-
selves to national reduction targets for 2050 of above 
100 percent for the benefit of Poland and other poten-
tial laggards. If they did, it is questionable whether 
they could ever derive an economic advantage from 
their lead in the development of CDR methods, and 
if so when. An obvious solution would be to set EU-
wide financial incentives for the generation of nega-
 
42 A similar dispute may occur at the international level 
in the medium to long term. If the international community 
does indeed make serious efforts to achieve net zero GHG 
emissions globally, emerging and developing countries will 
point to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibili-
ties and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) enshrined in the 
UNFCCC, and expect industrialised countries to lead the way 
by bringing their emissions well below zero. 
43 European Council, Meeting of the European Council (12 De-
cember 2019) – Conclusions, EUCO 29/19 (Brussels, 12 December 
2019), 1. 
44 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Establishing the Framework for Achieving Climate Neutrality 
and Amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) 
COM(2020) 80 final (Brussels, 4 March 2020). 
tive CO2 and to make the resulting credits usable 
across countries and economic sectors. Ultimately, 
however, this would mean that states and companies 
with objectively more difficult starting conditions 
would have to bear higher costs. Moreover, given 
the current structure of EU climate policy – which 
organises the emission reduction obligations of states 
and companies by clearly allocating them to three 
regulatory pillars (emissions trading, effort sharing 
between member states, and land use/forestry) – it 
would have to be determined in advance which groups 
of actors would be obliged to supply surpluses of 
negative CO2 in the long term. 
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Since the EU claims to base its climate policy on the 
climate science consensus developed in IPCC reports, 
it will no longer be concerned with whether to use 
CDR or not, but only how. However, in the coming 
years the integration of CO2 removal may essentially 
remain limited to the conceptual level of modelling 
and not (yet) be reflected in corresponding actions – 
which is a widespread phenomenon in climate 
policy.45 The first important window of opportunity 
will open up as part of the decision on tightening the 
EU climate target for 2030 – be it in strategic deci-
sions on the level and structure of the target, or in 
the subsequent legislative procedures for amending 
the EU’s three most important legal acts on climate 
policy: the Emissions Trading Directive, the Effort 
Sharing Regulation, and the Regulation on Land-Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). 
Currently, only a limited 
assessment is possible of how 
CDR will be integrated into European 
climate policy. 
Currently, only a limited assessment is possible 
of how the integration of CDR into European climate 
policy will proceed, because many of the relevant 
actors in this field (the EU Commission, member 
states, European Parliament, neighbouring states with 
regulatory links to the EU, companies, and environ-
mental NGOs) have not yet developed a substantial – 
and thus potentially stable – position on the role 
of CO2 removal. Nor have there been any meaningful 
studies on public acceptance of CDR or individual 
CDR methods in the EU.46 
 
45 Oliver Geden, “The Paris Agreement and the Inherent 
Inconsistency of Climate Policymaking”, WIREs Climate 
Change 7 (2016): 790–97. 
46 Surveys on the public acceptance of CDR generally 
suffer from the fact that the approach and individual 
methods are barely known and must first be explained in 
the surveys, with the type of explanation given in turn 
strongly influencing the respondents’ answers. Respondents 
also lack a decisive point of orientation, namely the percep-
European Commission 
The Commission is one of the driving forces behind 
the integration of CDR into EU climate policy. More 
than a decade ago, it advocated for including CO2 
removal from the atmosphere in the IPCC’s global 
mitigation scenarios. Since then, it has been instru-
mental in establishing the underlying modelling 
infrastructures in climate economics.47 However, for 
a long time deliberate CO2 removal played no part in 
EU-internal mitigation scenarios. This only changed 
in late 2018 with the presentation of a draft for a new 
long-term EU climate strategy, the formal launch for 
member states’ discussions on a new EU climate tar-
 
tible positioning of political and corporate actors with regard 
to CDR. Presumably the most valid statements can be made 
for BECCS, since its two components, bio-energy and CCS, 
have been part of the energy and climate policy debate for 
several years. Here, however, there are clear differences 
between European countries: for example, CCS is rated more 
positively in the UK than in Germany, and BECCS is rated 
more positively in both countries than fossil CCS, see 
Elisabeth Dütschke et al., “Differences in the Public Percep-
tion of CCS in Germany Depending on CO2 Source, Transport 
Option and Storage Location”, International Journal of Green-
house Gas Control 53 (2016): 149–59; Gareth Thomas, Nick 
Pidgeon and Erin Roberts, “Ambivalence, Naturalness and 
Normality in Public Perceptions of Carbon Capture and 
Storage in Biomass, Fossil Energy, and Industrial Applica-
tions in the United Kingdom”, Energy Research & Social Science 
46 (2018): 1–9; Rob Bellamy, Javier Lezaun and James 
Palmer, “Perceptions of Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and 
Storage in Different Policy Scenarios”, Nature Communications 
743 (2019): 1–9. 
47 Richard Moss et al., Towards New Scenarios for Analysis of 
Emissions, Climate Change, Impacts, and Response Strategies. Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change Expert Meeting Report, 19–21 
September 2007 (Geneva: IPCC, 2008); Beatrice Cointe, Chris-
tophe Cassen and Alain Nadaï, “Organising Policy-Relevant 
Knowledge for Climate Action – Integrated Assessment 
Modelling, the IPCC, and the Emergence of a Collective Ex-
pertise on Socioeconomic Emission Scenarios”, Science & 
Technology Studies 32, no. 4 (2019): 36–57. 
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get for 2050.48 With this strategy paper, the Com-
mission not only anchored the net zero vision in EU 
climate policy, it also explicitly declared CO2 removals 
to be one of its strategic priorities in pursuing a net 
zero policy. The main focus of future mitigation 
efforts will certainly continue to be on avoiding GHG 
emissions. However, the amounts of residual emis-
sions and corresponding CO2 removals in 2050 will 
be considerable (see Figure 2). 
As far as technological CDR methods 
are concerned, the Commission so far 
relies only on BECCS and DACCS, 
which are to be used from 2035. 
By combining two different net zero scenarios (one 
with higher levels of technology-based CDR, and one 
with relatively low levels), the Commission’s accom-
panying technical analysis assumes49 that residual 
emissions of over 550 million tonnes (Mt) will be off-
set by CDR in 2050, which is the equivalent of about 
10 percent of EU emissions in 1990. The Commis-
sion’s strategy document envisages that CO2 removals 
from land use and forestry should be increased again, 
contrary to the current trend, and that the land sink 
should be fully counted towards the EU climate target 
in the future. In emissions reporting by the EU and 
its member states, the (net negative) LULUCF emis-
sions are shown separately. Until 2020, they will not 
be counted at all towards meeting the EU emission 
reduction target (20 percent). For the 2030 target (cur-
rently at 40 percent), they will be included to a small 
extent, but only if individual member states choose 
to use the individually determined maximum levels 
of LULUCF credits for meeting their obligations under 
the Effort Sharing Regulation. As far as technological 
CDR methods are concerned, the Commission has so 
far referred exclusively to BECCS and DACCS, which 
are expected to be deployed from 2035 onwards.50 
 
48 Oliver Geden and Felix Schenuit, Climate Neutrality as 
Long-term Strategy. The EU’s Net Zero Target and Its Consequences 
for Member States, SWP Comment 33/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2019). 
49 European Commission, In-Depth Analysis in Support of the 
COM(2018) 773: A Clean Planet for All – A European Strategic Long-
term Vision for a Prosperous, Modern, Competitive and Climate 
Neutral Economy (Brussels, 28 November 2018), Table 9. 
50 See ibid., 188ff.; Pantelis Capros et al., “Energy-system 
Modelling of the EU Strategy towards Climate-neutrality”, 
Energy Policy 134 (2019): 110960. 
While the Commission has thus conceptually 
upgraded the status of CDR, it is not yet possible to 
estimate what effect this will have in political and 
administrative practice. In its communication on the 
European Green Deal, CDR-relevant initiatives are not 
mentioned with one exception: the development of 
a new EU forestry strategy.51 By contrast, the Commis-
sion’s draft of the European Climate Law explicitly 
refers to the necessary use of “natural and technolog-
ical” removal methods to achieve the goal of GHG 
neutrality throughout the EU.52 Recently, measures 
for CO2 removal were taken into account within the 
European Commission’s Circular Economy Action 
Plan. It focuses on removal measures described as 
‘natural’ and announces a regulatory framework 
for the certification of carbon removal methods by 
2023.53 This initiative was also taken up in the EU 
Commission’s “Farm to Fork” strategy, in which the 
certification proposal has been complemented by the 
idea of using money from the Common Agriculture 
Policy to reward farmers and foresters who sequester 
carbon.54 Large CDR research projects are already 
being funded under the EU’s Horizon 2020 research 
framework programme. The Commission is also pro-
viding political support for new projects on CO2 cap-
ture, transport and geological storage (Port of Rotterdam 
and Northern Lights). It has also announced that it will 
support pilot and demonstration plants for CCS and 
CDR from the approximately €10 billion Innovation 
Fund, which will be part of the Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) from 2021. 
Member States 
So far, member states have given few hints on how 
they intend to deal strategically with CDR in the 
future. This will change during the negotiations on 
the EU Climate Law. However, member states that 
have already adopted national greenhouse gas neu-
trality targets have generally done so without detailed 
 
51 European Commission, The European Green Deal, 
COM(2019) 640 final (Brussels, 11 December 2019). 
52 European Commission, Proposal for EU Climate Law 
(see note 44). 
53 European Commission, A New Circular Economy Action 
Plan: for a Cleaner and More Competitive Europe, COM(2020) 98 
final (Brussels, 11 March 2020). 
54 European Commission, A Farm to Fork Strategy for a Fair, 
Healthy and Environmentally-Friendly Food System, COM(2020) 381 
final (Brussels, 20 May 2020). 
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consideration of the level of residual emissions that 
can be expected in the first net zero year, or how the 
corresponding CO2 removals are to be realised. So far, 
announcing a national net zero target has been pri-
marily an act of political marketing. Although the 
governments of Sweden (2045), Portugal (2050), France 
(2050), Finland (2035), Germany (2050) and Austria 
(2040) have already decided on national net zero tar-
gets, none of these countries has a plan for a dedi-
cated national CDR policy yet. Accordingly, there is 
also a lack of active positioning on this issue at the 
EU level.55 
 
55 National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP), whose sub-
mission by the end of 2019 was mandatory as part of the 
Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union, only 
have a time horizon of 2040 for emission projections, and 
generally contain only brief references to deliberate CO2 
removal policies. While technological CDR options are 
However, governments often also develop their 
position reactively, in relation to specific Commission 
plans or the positions of other member states. Particu-
lar importance is likely to be attached to the future 
stance of those member states whose current emis-
 
barely mentioned, the (potential) sink performance of land 
use and forestry plays a far greater part, albeit mostly in the 
context of meeting national commitments under the LULUCF 
Regulation. Draft NECPs had to be submitted by the end of 
2018 and were subsequently evaluated by the Commission. 
The European Council’s commitment to a European net zero 
target for 2050, first made on 12 December 2019, had no in-
fluence on the NECPs, which were submitted on time by 
the end of 2019 and usually comprise several hundred pages. 
Even the NECPs which were submitted, significantly late, in 
the first half of 2020 make only cursory references to the EU-
wide GHG neutrality target. Germany and Luxembourg sub-
mitted their plans six months late, by 11 June 2020. Only 
Ireland has not yet submitted its final NECP. 
Figure 2 
 
 
Source: European Commission, A Clean Planet for All. A European Strategic Long-term Vision for a Prosperous, Modern, 
Competitive and Climate-neutral Economy, COM(2018) 773 (Brussels, 28 November 2018). 
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sion profiles indicate comparatively high levels of 
residual emissions, and those that for political or eco-
nomic reasons are unwilling to commit to achieving 
net zero emissions as early as 2050. The first group 
includes Ireland, where 33 percent of total emissions 
come from agriculture, a large proportion of which 
are methane and nitrous oxide, which, if current pro-
duction structures are maintained, will be difficult 
or impossible to eliminate. Ireland is likely to find it 
very difficult to fully offset the expected high levels of 
residual emissions with CO2 removals,
56 all the more 
so since it currently belongs to the very small group 
of member states for which LULUCF is not a net sink 
but a source of emissions. In the not unlikely event 
of Ireland declaring itself unable to achieve net zero 
emissions on its national territory, the expectation 
would be that net negative emissions will be gen-
erated in other member states. 
The second group is currently led by Poland, whose 
government, in the European Council conclusions 
on the net zero target for 2050, stated that it “cannot 
commit to implement this objective as far as it is con-
cerned”. The Polish government has repeatedly argued 
in the negotiations that a national net zero level is 
unlikely to be achieved before 2070. From today’s 
perspective, this would also mean that emissions by 
other EU member states would have to be net nega-
tive by the middle of the century – and considerably 
so – due to the relatively large volume of Polish 
emissions.57 For both Ireland and Poland, there are 
good reasons why achieving the net zero target is 
more challenging than for the EU average. Whether 
this will be recognised, and if so under what con-
ditions, is primarily a question of the negotiating 
power of the governments concerned. 
The fact that some EU member states – especially 
those in the north and west – are making greater 
efforts in mitigation than others is by no means new. 
However, the expectation, which seems paradoxical 
from today’s perspective, that some countries should 
go below zero before 2050 so that others can stay above 
zero (for the time being), is likely to be challenged by 
 
56 A similar problem exists in New Zealand, where the 
government has therefore refrained from legislating on a net 
GHG target for 2050. Net zero there refers only to long-lived 
greenhouse gases (such as CO2 or nitrous oxide), while bio-
genic methane from agriculture is to be reduced by only 
24–47 percent between 2017 and 2050. 
57 After the UK left the EU, Poland became its second 
largest emitter, behind Germany and ahead of France and 
Italy. 
member states expected to be frontrunners – espe-
cially if no economic benefits can be achieved by 
using removal methods. However, a closer look at 
those countries and governments that have already 
adopted net zero targets shows that CDR planning 
is still in its infancy. 
In Austria, the new governing coalition announced 
a surprisingly ambitious climate neutrality target 
for 2040 at the beginning of 2020, but did not outline 
whether the national emissions pathway should be 
below zero by 2050. To compensate for residual emis-
sions, Austria will give priority to LULUCF sinks.58 In 
Finland, the government, which took office in 2019, 
has agreed on a net zero target for 2035 as an inter-
mediate step towards net negative emissions. How-
ever, the NECP does not yet contain specific measures 
to meet this self-imposed target. To compensate for 
residual emissions, Finland has declared its intention 
to expand sinks from land use and forestry, and has 
announced a separate sub-target for CO2 removal.
59 
France is the only EU member state to have announced 
in its NECP that it will use a technological CO2 re-
moval method to achieve its zero emissions target. 
In 2050, 10 Mt are to be contributed from BECCS. 
However, the government in Paris has not yet spe-
cified how the corresponding capacities could be built 
up and where the CO2 would be stored.
60 In Portugal, 
the government committed itself in 2016 to making 
the country GHG-neutral by 2050, and in 2019 out-
lined possible ways to achieve this in a national long-
term strategy. It envisages using only the LULUCF 
sink to compensate for residual emissions.61 
With its Climate Change Act of December 2019, 
Germany has also expressly committed itself to the net 
zero target for 2050. However, it is not yet clear to 
what extent CO2 removals will be necessary, and what 
 
58 ÖVP and Die Grünen, Aus Verantwortung für Österreich. 
Government Programme 2020–2024 (Vienna, 2020). 
59 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Fin-
land, Finland’s Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (Helsinki, 
20 December 2019). 
60 10 Mt CO2 corresponds to about 2 percent of France’s 
emissions of 1990, see Ministère de la Transition écologique 
et solidaire, Projet de Plan National Integré Énergie-Climat de la 
France (2019). 
61 Ministry of the Environment and Energy Transition 
of Portugal, Fundo Ambiental and Portugese Environment 
Agency (APA), Roadmap for Carbon Neutrality 2050 (RNC2050). 
Long-term Strategy for Carbon Neutrality of the Portuguese Economy 
by 2050 (Lisbon, 2020). 
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methods will be used to achieve them.62 While the 
Climate Change Act highlights the role of LULUCF, 
the final NECP mentions the necessity of both bio-
logical and technical CDR methods to “close the car-
bon cycle” in industrial processes, but without going 
into detail.63 Responses by the German government 
to parliamentary questions on this issue64 suggest that 
the current preference is for expanding the LULUCF 
sink. The reason for this is not only that this sink cur-
rently accounts for only about 2 percent of 1990 emis-
sions, far below the EU average,65 but also the low 
levels of public acceptance of geological CO2 storage 
in Germany, which would hinder the deployment of 
BECCS and DACCS.66 The German Ministry for Educa-
tion and Research recently launched two major 
research programmes for both marine and terrestrial 
CDR. 
The most advanced CDR debate within the EU so 
far is in Sweden. In 2016 the country already set itself 
a net zero emissions target for 2045, making explicit, 
like Finland, its intent to generate net negative emis-
sions thereafter. Yet when announcing the net zero 
target, the government only specified that 85 percent 
would be achieved with conventional mitigation 
measures. A government commission was formed in 
 
62 Usually, the German Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety and the German 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy each independently 
commission macroeconomic mitigation scenarios. The estab-
lished modelling consortia have not yet published any 
studies for a net 100 percent reduction by 2050. 
63 See German Bundestag, “Gesetz zur Einführung eines 
Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetzes und zur Änderung weiterer 
Vorschriften, vom 12. Dezember 2019”, Bundesgesetzblatt, part 
I, no. 48 (17 December 2019): 2513–21, and Bundesministe-
rium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi), Integrierter natio-
naler Energie- und Klimaplan (Berlin, June 2020). 
64 German Bundestag, Drucksache 19/7400, 29 January 2019; 
idem., Drucksache 19/14052, 15 October 2019. 
65 In 2018 the net LULUCF sink in Germany was 27 Mt. 
66 Not using CCS is the position taken, for example, by the 
German Environment Agency (UBA), which has published 
the only study to date on the achievement of a net zero tar-
get for 2050 in Germany, and in which it states a priori that 
this target must be achieved without CCS. In its most ambi-
tious scenario, the UBA authors assume zero macroeconomic 
growth from 2030, which clearly contradicts the currently 
dominant climate policy paradigm, Umweltbundesamt, 
Resource-Efficient Pathways towards Greenhouse Gas Neutrality – 
RESCUE: Summary Report (Dessau-Roßlau, November 2019); 
see also Dütschke et al., “Differences in the Public Perception 
of CCS in Germany” (see note 46). 
2018 to draw up proposals on how the remaining 15 
percent could be achieved. Discussions are underway, 
for example, on making greater use of LULUCF sinks, 
including the use of international project-based cred-
its or incentivising technological CDR methods. The 
corresponding report was submitted in January 2020,67 
and a fundamental decision by the Swedish govern-
ment on how to deal with CDR is still pending. The 
Climate Action Plan, which the government presented 
at the end of 2019, already announces a commitment 
to promoting BECCS. This process could be used in 
Sweden not only in biomass-fired power and heat 
plants, but also in pulp and paper plants, which are 
responsible for a large share of Sweden’s industrial 
emissions.68 If Sweden were to start counting its CO2 
removals from land use and forestry fully towards 
meeting its national climate target, the country could 
achieve net zero emissions before 2030.69 
Neighbouring Countries with 
Regulatory Links 
The EU’s climate policy not only regulates the emis-
sion sources and sinks of its current 27 member 
states. It also has direct and indirect effects on a num-
ber of neighbouring European countries via regulatory 
links. For example, Iceland and Norway, as members 
of the European Economic Area (EEA), are also part 
of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. From 2021 Nor-
way, with its own national targets, will also be in-
cluded in the effort sharing and LULUCF regulations. 
The national emissions trading system of the non-EEA 
member Switzerland has been linked to the EU ETS 
since 2020. In the case of the United Kingdom, it is 
considered likely that the country will be interested 
 
67 Among the three options mentioned CDR is considered 
to have the largest potential, especially BECCS and biochar. 
International project credits should be possible, but as of 
2045 only from CDR projects, see Statens offentliga utred-
ningar, Vägen till en klimatpositiv framtid (Stockholm, 2020). 
68 Anton A. Hansing and Mathias Fridahl, “European and 
Swedish Point Sources of Biogenic Carbon Dioxide”, in Bio-
energy with Carbon Capture and Storage. From Global Potentials to 
Domestic Realities, ed. Mathias Fridahl (Stockholm and Brus-
sels: The European Liberal Forum, 2018), 31–44. 
69 Sweden’s emissions in 2017 were 52.7 Mt without 
LULUCF. If the LULUCF sink of 43.7 Mt had been fully in-
cluded, the emissions would have been only 9 Mt. Compared 
to 1990, this would already have represented an 87 percent 
reduction in emissions. 
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in linking its new nationally organised emissions 
trading with that of the EU. Moreover, it is likely that 
a European net zero policy will also bring into focus 
the very large CO2 storage capacities that Norway and 
the UK have under the seabed of the North Sea.70 Due 
to these diverse interdependencies, an EU CDR policy 
will be directly and indirectly influenced by steps 
taken in these neighbouring countries. If Switzerland, 
Norway or the UK make CO2 removal an integral part 
of their climate policy, this will promote similar 
developments within the EU. 
In 2019 the Swiss government adopted a net zero 
target for 2050. The details of the new Swiss climate 
strategy are to be worked out in the course of 2020. 
In its announcement, the Swiss government already 
pointed out that to compensate for residual emis-
sions, “technologies will also be used that permanently 
extract greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and 
store them” alongside international project credits 
and biological CO2 sinks, and that domestic industry 
and research institutions will play an important role 
in the development of such technologies.71 The Swiss 
government is thus trying to integrate CDR directly 
into the dominant climate policy paradigm and make 
it compatible with the promise of future green growth. 
By doing so, it is implicitly emphasising the role of 
Climeworks, a company that emerged from ETH Zurich 
and is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of 
direct air capture systems. 
The UK is currently the world’s leader in integrat-
ing CDR into climate policy. This is probably due to 
 
70 These capacities would be relevant not only for CO2 
from BECCS and DACCS, but also for captured CO2 from in-
dustrial processes, such as steel and cement production. 
Norway has been positioning itself as a potential recipient 
of CO2 from the EU for several years now, but this would 
require the development of an adequate transport infra-
structure, see Jo-Kristian S. Røttereng, “When Climate Policy 
Meets Foreign Policy: Pioneering and National Interest in 
Norway’s Mitigation Strategy”, Energy Research & Social Science 
39 (2018). 216–25. Contrary to media reports, Norway has 
not yet adopted a national net zero target. There is only a 
parliamentary resolution to this effect, which is not consid-
ered binding by the minority government in office, see 
Erlend A. Hermansen, Glen Peters and Bård Lahn, “Climate 
Neutrality the Norwegian Way: Carbon Trading?” CICERO 
[Oslo], 17 September 2019, https://cicero.oslo.no/no/posts/ 
nyheter/climate-neutrality-the-norwegian-way-carbon-
trading (accessed 11 February 2020). 
71 Swiss Federal Council, “Bundesrat will bis 2050 eine 
klimaneutrale Schweiz”, Federal Council press releases (Bern, 
28 August 2019). 
two main factors: first, the institutionalised integra-
tion of scientific expertise into the UK’s policy pro-
cess, which is guaranteed by the UK Climate Change 
Act of 2008; and second, the traditionally high degree 
of technological openness in the country’s climate 
policy. The independent Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC), which advises government and parlia-
ment on all aspects of climate policy and submits 
proposals for national emissions budgets in five-year 
increments,72 already suggested in 2016 that CDR 
methods, and in particular BECCS, should be widely 
used to achieve an 80 to 90 percent reduction target 
by 2050.73 The first interdisciplinary CDR research 
programme was launched in 2017. In the same year, 
the government explicitly included CDR technologies 
in its Clean Growth Strategy, while the CCC commis-
sioned a detailed catalogue of progress indicators for 
CDR.74 Not surprisingly, a CCC study commissioned 
by the government on the possibilities of achieving 
net zero at the national level by 2050 recommends 
the extensive use of CO2 removal methods.
75 Follow-
ing the official adoption of this target in June 2019, 
the government announced the following autumn 
that it would set up a programme to support CDR 
demonstration projects worth the equivalent of 
almost 40 million euros.76 In contrast with other 
European countries, the UK already has a wealth 
of studies on the technical potential and regulatory 
incentives for the use of various CO2 capture meth-
ods.77 Nevertheless, the British government has not 
 
72 Felix Schenuit and Oliver Geden, “Ein deutsches Klima-
schutzgesetz nach britischem Vorbild: Voraussetzungen einer 
Realisierung”, Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 68, no. 10 
(2018): 16–18. 
73 Committee on Climate Change (CCC), UK Climate Action 
Following the Paris Agreement, CCC Report (London, 2016). 
74 UK Government, Clean Growth Strategy. Leading the Way 
to a Low Carbon Future, London 2017; Tom Berg, Goher-Ur-
Rehman Mir and Ann-Kathrin Kühner, CCC Indicators to Track 
Progress in Developing Greenhouse Gas Removal Options. Final Report 
(Utrecht: Ecofys Netherlands, 2017). 
75 Its study assumes conventional emission reductions of 
89 percent by 2050 and correspondingly large CDR volumes 
of more than 100 Mt, see CCC, Net Zero – The UK’s Contribution 
to Stopping Global Warming (London, 2019). 
76 United Kingdom Research and Innovation (UKRI), UKRI 
Greenhouse Gas Removal Demonstrators Call for Proposals (Swin-
don, 2019), https://bbsrc.ukri.org/documents/ukri-call-for-
proposals-spf-ggr-demonstrators-2019-2020/. 
77 See Pete Smith, R. Stuart Haszeldine and Stephen M. 
Smith, “Preliminary Assessment of the Potential for, and 
Limitations to, Terrestrial Negative Emission Technologies 
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yet indicated which methods it intends to prioritise or 
which incentive systems it intends to establish.78 
European Parliament 
Although the European Parliament is one of the more 
progressive players in EU climate policy, it has so far 
made little progress on the issue of CDR. During the 
negotiations on the Regulation on the Governance 
System for the Energy Union, which was concluded 
in 2018, it was the EP which succeeded in getting the 
Council to explicitly mention the long-term option 
of a European net negative emissions pathway. How-
ever, this did not result in any noticeable action on 
the part of the EP with regard to CDR. In its own-ini-
tiative reports, CO2 removal has not been given prior-
ity to date. Nor has a firm CDR approach played any 
role in recent legislative procedures – for example, 
in the amendments to the Emissions Trading Direc-
tive, the Effort Sharing Regulation, and the revision 
of the LULUCF Regulation during the last legislative 
period. Currently, there is no solid evidence of how 
the EP in its current composition will position itself 
on CDR. The first indication will be the EP’s negotia-
tion position on the EU Climate Law. 
 
in the UK”, Environmental Science: Processes & Impacts 18, no. 11 
(2016): 1400–05; Devon Platt, Mark Workman and Stephen 
Hall, “A Novel Approach to Assessing the Commercial Op-
portunities for Greenhouse Gas Removal Technology Value 
Chains: Developing the Case for a Negative Emissions Credit 
in the UK”, Journal of Cleaner Production 203 (2018): 1003–18; 
Habiba A. Daggash et al., Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and 
Storage, and Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage: Examining the 
Evidence on Deployment Potential and Costs in the UK (London: UK 
Research Centre, April 2019); Renewable Energy Association, 
Going Negative – Policy Proposals for UK Bio-energy with Carbon 
Capture and Storage (BECCS), REA Position Paper (London: 
Renewable Energy Association, 2019). 
78 In contrast to the CCC’s recommendation, the British 
government does not exclude the use of international project 
credits, but has not yet taken a position on what share these 
could have in achieving the target. Possible incentive sys-
tems and regulatory options for removal methods were ex-
amined by the Department for Business, Energy and Indus-
trial Strategy (BEIS) in 2019, see Vivid Economics, Greenhouse 
Gas Removal (GGR) Policy Options – Final Report (London, 2019). 
Business 
Within the European climate policy paradigm, busi-
ness actors are addressed in two ways: as (emitting) 
parties responsible for the problem, and as potential 
drivers of innovation with green growth opportuni-
ties. The same applies to the issue of CO2 removal. 
The implementation of the net zero target in almost 
all European countries brings with it new responsi-
bilities, first of all the expectation that every business 
will explore ways of eliminating its emissions as far 
as possible and compensate for the remainder.79At the 
same time, there is at least an implicit assumption 
that there will be a significant future demand for CO2 
removal, which will also offer market opportunities 
to innovative companies, which far exceed their own 
need for offsetting residual emissions. 
Apart from a few exceptions, European companies 
and industry associations have not yet taken a posi-
tion on the CDR approach and the regulatory frame-
work required for it.80 One exception is the Swiss-
based DAC manufacturer Climeworks, whose business 
model – filtering carbon dioxide from ambient air – 
can only be successful if CDR becomes an integral 
part of the climate policy of industrialised and emerg-
 
79 This is already reflected in many corporate announce-
ments on the (imminent) achievement of carbon or climate 
neutrality, for example by Bosch (2020), Siemens (2030), Mars 
(2040) or Shell (2050). Such announcements are based on self-
defined system boundaries and generally provide for the 
inclusion of international emission credits that are currently 
only weakly regulated. They are based on a voluntary ap-
proach and are thus an expression of corporate social respon-
sibility. This must be strictly distinguished from future EU 
legislation, which will be binding as to which CO2 removal 
activities and which international credits are eligible, see 
Burkhard Huckestein, “Klimaneutrale Unternehmen und 
Verwaltungen: Wirksamer Klimaschutz oder Grünfärberei?”, 
GAIA – Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society 29, no. 1 
(2020): 21–26. 
80 The world’s most ambitious announcement to date 
comes from Microsoft, which aims to achieve net negative 
emissions by 2030, including its entire supply chain, and 
without recourse to international emission reduction credits. 
The plans – although voluntary – envisage CO2 removals 
of 5 Mt by 2030, using a broad portfolio of biological and 
technological methods. By 2050, Microsoft wants to have off-
set all the emissions it has caused since it was founded, see 
Brad Smith, “Microsoft Will Be Carbon Negative by 2030”, 
Official Microsoft Blog, 16 January 2020, https://blogs.microsoft. 
com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoft-will-be-carbon-negative-by-
2030/ (accessed 11 February 2020). 
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ing countries. Since there are as yet no effective in-
centive systems for geological CO2 storage, DAC plants 
can currently only be used commercially if the CO2 
removed from the air is reused, for example in the 
beverage industry or in refineries.81 
Politically, companies that want to make CO2 
removal an integral part of long-established business 
models carry far more weight. These are found pri-
marily in countries with net zero targets and advanced 
CDR debates. Stockholm Exergi, for example, the Swe-
dish capital’s electricity and district heating provider, 
is not only planning the extensive decarbonisation 
of its already predominantly biomass-fuelled produc-
tion, but also wants to bring emissions below zero 
in the medium term with the help of BECCS and bio-
char.82 In the UK, the operator of what used to be 
the country’s largest coal-fired power plant, the Drax 
Group, has announced that it will gradually switch 
its electricity generation completely to biomass 
and generate net negative emissions with the help 
of BECCS by 2030.83 Both companies already operate 
BECCS demonstration plants, but argue that govern-
ment support will be required to launch commercial 
operations. While Drax expects to be able to store the 
captured CO2 on UK territory, Stockholm Exergi plans 
to transport its CO2 to Norway. 
It is to be expected that companies in the energy 
sector would be among the CDR pioneers. The option 
of using BECCS in power plants still dominates CDR 
portfolios in climate-economic scenarios. Of the Euro-
pean Commission’s two net zero emission scenarios, 
the more technology-orientated one similarly assumes 
that the European power sector will already remove 
141 Mt CO2 from the atmosphere in 2050. However, 
its industry association has not yet adopted this view: 
Eurelectric’s long-term vision assumes that the Euro-
pean power sector can achieve net zero emissions by 
2045, based on renewables and nuclear energy, but 
without CDR. So far, the relevant strategy documents 
have made no mention of the possibility that the 
power sector would subsequently move below zero. 
 
81 Christoph Beuttler, Louise Charles and Jan Wurzbacher, 
“The Role of Direct Air Capture in Mitigation of Anthro-
pogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions”, Frontiers in Climate 1, 
no. 10 (2019): 1–7. 
82 Fabian Levihn et al., “Introducing BECCS through HPC 
to the Research Agenda: The Case of Combined Heat and 
Power in Stockholm”, Energy Reports 5 (2019): 1381–89. 
83 “British Power Plant Promises to Go Carbon Negative by 
2030”, BBC News, 10 December 2019, https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/business-50712500 (accessed 11 February 2020). 
The extent to which the sector could benefit finan-
cially from the use of CDR largely depends on how 
the relevant regulation is designed, how technology 
develops, and what price per negative ton of CO2 can 
be obtained in the ETS. For example, the technology-
orientated Commission scenario assumes that in 2050 
emissions in the entire ETS will be at minus 50 Mt. 
Sectors such as the steel, cement, chemical and avia-
tion industries will still be allowed some residual 
emissions, which the power sector will (over)compen-
sate for with CO2 removal.
84 Outside the emissions 
trading system, agriculture would also be a major 
consumer of negative CO2. Emissions that are difficult 
or unavoidable in this sector could be offset by re-
moval methods such as biochar or increased carbon 
sequestration in soils but above all by the much 
larger sinks in forestry.85 Whether viable business 
ideas and solutions can be derived from this modelled 
constellation, is almost impossible to predict from 
today’s perspective.86 Nevertheless, it is foreseeable 
that the option of CO2 removal will change future 
climate policy expectations of economic sectors and 
companies. 
Non-governmental Organisations 
Environmental NGOs do not deny that the zero emis-
sions vision they share contains a net element, i.e. 
residual emissions and CDR. However, there is wide-
spread fear among them that upgrading the CDR 
approach could undermine the integrity of European 
climate policy – either on a conceptual level or 
by using methods that NGOs consider problematic, 
especially BECCS and DACCS. Compared to the Euro-
pean Commission and national governments, NGOs 
generally advocate earlier net zero target dates and 
lower volumes of residual emissions or CDR. The um-
brella organisation of European climate policy NGOs, 
CAN Europe, for example, is calling for a target year of 
 
84 See European Commission, In-Depth Analysis 
(see note 49), Table 9. 
85 To reduce the pressure on the agricultural sector, 
national and European agricultural associations now often 
attribute forestry sinks to their own sector, and sometimes 
also emission reductions from biomass cultivation, see, e.g., 
Copa-Cogeca, Copa and Cogeca Position on Climate Action (Brus-
sels, September 2019). 
86 Puro.earth is a trading platform for certified CO2 removal 
credits, which has so far focused on biochar and the storage 
of CO2 in durable products, with low trading volumes. 
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2040 and extensive decarbonisation of all emission 
sectors. With reference to the concept of “nature-based 
solutions” that has become popular in recent years,87 
CAN Europe wants to see the use of CO2 removal meth-
ods limited to “proven” practices such as the restora-
tion of ecosystems or increasing CO2 storage in soils.
88 
Technical methods such as BECCS or DACCS are usually 
not mentioned at all in position papers or are rejected 
as “artificial” and “risky”.89 The politically constructed 
dividing line between “natural” and “artificial” CDR 
methods is a defining element of the European NGO 
discourse. Only a few national organisations have 
dropped this line of argument, such as the British sec-
tion of the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), in 
whose net zero scenario for 2045 technological meth-
ods such as BECCS and DACCS generate higher CDR 
volumes than ecosystem-based approaches.90 
 
87 For a justification of this approach, which made it pos-
sible for NGOs to refer positively to CDR in the first place, 
see Bronson W. Griscom et al., “Natural Climate Solutions”, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America 114, no. 44 (2017): 11645–50; for a discussion 
of the concept, see Rob Bellamy and Shannon Osaka, “Un-
natural Climate Solutions?” Nature Climate Change 10 (2020): 
98–99. 
88 Climate Action Network Europe (CAN), CAN Europe Posi-
tion on Long Term Targets (Brussels, 4 October 2018). 
89 The German section of Fridays for Future does not ex-
plicitly reject technological sinks, but – in contrast with 
the IPCC – excludes them from the outset when defining 
net zero. The glossary for its list of demands, which includes 
GHG neutrality by 2035, states: “net zero: only the amount 
of greenhouse gases that is recaptured by natural processes 
(e.g. plant growth) is emitted”, https://fridaysforfuture.de/ 
forderungen/glossar/ (accessed 2 February 2020). 
90 See the report by Vivid Economics, Keeping it Cool: How 
the UK Can End Its Contribution to Climate Change (London, 2018). 
Although the German WWF section believes there are out-
standing questions on the sustainability of CCS, it does not 
reject CCS in principle, see WWF Deutschland, Klimaschutz in 
der Industrie. Forderungen an die Bundesregierung für einen klima-
neutralen Industriestandort Deutschland (Berlin, 2019). 
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If the EU truly wants to meet its own climate policy 
goals, it will not be able to avoid pursuing the uncon-
ventional mitigation approach of CO2 removal from 
the atmosphere – in addition to far-reaching con-
ventional emission reduction measures. The general 
public will most likely only realise that the use of 
CDR methods is necessary when the EU, or at least 
some of its environmentally progressive member 
states, starts to adopt net negative targets. The re-
moval of atmospheric CO2 is, however, already in-
dispensable for achieving the EU’s agreed net zero 
target by 2050, since not all emission sources can be 
completely eliminated (e.g. in agriculture, the steel 
and cement industry, or aviation) and because these 
residual emissions must be compensated for by CDR 
methods. 
The Commission has begun to devote significant 
attention to the concept of CO2 removal. So far, how-
ever, there have at best been vague indications as to 
which member states, party groups, industries, busi-
nesses, and NGOs want to promote a CDR approach, 
what coalitions are emerging, and which methods are 
preferred. Since it is also difficult to predict how the 
individual removal methods will develop in the com-
ing decade in terms of technology and costs, it is cur-
rently impossible to predict how the transition to a 
European CDR policy will take place, or how quickly.91 
 
91 See Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Ambiguity and Choice in 
European Public Policy”, Journal of European Public Policy 15, 
no. 4 (2008): 514–30; Aleh Cherp et al., “Integrating Tech-
no-economic, Socio-technical and Political Perspectives on 
National Energy Transitions: A Meta-theoretical Framework”, 
Energy Research & Social Science 37 (2018): 175–90; Cameron 
Roberts and Frank W. Geels, “Conditions for Politically Ac-
celerated Transitions: Historical Institutionalism, the Multi-
level Perspective, and Two Historical Case Studies in Trans-
Consequently, it would also be premature to draw up 
very detailed regulatory proposals for the EU. 
Removal of atmospheric CO2 is 
indispensable for attaining the EU’s 
agreed net zero target by 2050. 
The following section therefore outlines two typi-
cal variants, one cautious and one proactive, of devel-
oping an EU CDR policy in the coming decade. Our 
focus is on (climate) policy decisions and initial ap-
proaches to implementing them in regulation. Reli-
able estimates of the CDR volumes that can be realised 
in each case cannot be made here. Inter alia, this is 
due to the fact that the material effects of integrating 
CDR into climate policy would probably not be fully 
felt until the 2030s, especially with technological CDR 
methods such as BECCS, DACCS or enhanced weather-
ing. 
Among the governance mechanisms of EU climate 
policy, setting quantified medium and long-term goals 
is paramount, regardless of whether these are legally 
binding or (initially) only indicative and symbolic in 
nature.92 A determining factor for whether or not 
the EU chooses to embark on a targeted CO2 removal 
policy is therefore likely to be the following, politi-
cally still unanswered, question: which emission re-
duction pathway is the EU aiming for once net zero 
 
port and Agriculture”, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change 140 (2019): 221–40. 
92 Oliver Geden and Severin Fischer, Moving Targets. Nego-
tiations on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy Objectives for the Post-
2020 Period and Implications for the German Energy Transition, 
SWP Research Paper 3/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, March 2014); Claire Dupont and Sebastian Ober-
thür, eds., Decarbonization in the European Union. Internal Policies 
and External Strategies (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
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emissions have been reached? While a net zero target 
logically entails the use of CDR, climate policy com-
munication barely mentions this fact. A net negative 
vision, which goes one step further and is already 
set out in the Governance Regulation for the Energy 
Union, can be divided into two illustrative pathways 
(see Figure 3). 
On the one hand, CDR volumes could be kept 
stable in the decades after achieving the net zero 
target, i.e. EU climate policy could follow a limited CDR 
approach. If residual emissions continued to decline 
initially (due to technical progress or changing con-
sumption patterns),93 EU net emissions would stabil-
ise quite quickly. Alternatively, the EU could try to 
keep steadily reducing its own net emissions in line 
with the Paris Agreement and the IPCC’s global miti-
gation scenarios by means of ever more CDR – i.e. to 
move deeper and deeper into negative territory to an 
extent hardly conceivable today. By pursuing a com-
prehensive CDR approach, the EU would make an impor-
tant contribution to the success of international cli-
mate policy, in line with its historical responsibility 
and current economic potential. The EU would thus 
at least help to achieve the global net zero GHG emis-
sions target (Art. 4 of the Paris Agreement) by giving 
emerging economies and developing countries more 
time to bring their emissions down to zero.94 Should 
the world actually reach the global net zero target in 
the second half of the century, this would at least 
stop the global temperature rise.95 
 
93 Detlef P. Van Vuuren et al., “Alternative Pathways to 
the 1.5°C Target Reduce the Need for Negative Emission 
Technologies”, Nature Climate Change 8, no. 5 (2018): 391–97; 
Bataille, “Physical and Policy Pathways to Net-zero Emissions 
Industry” (see note 39). 
94 Glen P. Peters et al., “Measuring a Fair and Ambitious 
Climate Agreement Using Cumulative Emissions”, Environ-
mental Research Letters 10, no. 100504 (2015): 1–9. 
95 However, it is highly probable that such a stabilisation 
would be above 1.5°C, see Rogelj et al., “Mitigation Path-
ways” (see note 5). By pursuing a net negative strategy, the 
EU could make a significant contribution to decreasing 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations again, to keep the duration 
of the overshoot of the targeted temperature threshold as 
short as possible, see Kirsten Zickfeld, Vivek K. Arora and 
Nathan P. Gillet, “Is the Climate Response to CO2 Emissions 
Path Dependent?” Geophysical Research Letters 39, no. 5 (2012): 
1–6; Oliver Geden and Andreas Löschel, “Define Limits for 
Temperature Overshoot Targets”, Nature Geoscience 10, no. 12 
(2017): 881–82; Kate L. Ricke, Richard J. Miller and Douglas 
MacMartin, “Constraints on Global Temperature Target 
Overshoot”, Scientific Reports 7, no. 14743 (2017): 1–7. 
The integration of the currently still unconven-
tional CO2 removal approach into climate policy will 
ultimately only succeed if its potential for being an 
irritation to the prevailing climate policy paradigm 
is minimised, i.e. if the paradigm is supplemented 
rather than undermined. In essence, therefore, nei-
ther the description of the central cause of the cli-
mate change problem nor the existing allocation of 
responsibility for contributions to solving the prob-
lem must change. Since emissions of greenhouse 
gases (and especially CO2) are at the core of the prob-
lem, avoiding them must be given political priority 
over their subsequent removal. Moreover, the impres-
sion must be avoided that some member states and 
sectors benefit disproportionately and at the expense 
of other actors from the conceptual integration of 
CDR. By contrast, however, the EU’s climate policy 
narrative, which has been successful so far, may need 
to be adapted. Two areas are of particular importance 
for a “paradigm-sustaining” integration of CDR into 
EU climate policy: the specific design of the net zero 
target, and the development of a basic policy design. 
Entry Pathways 
Proactive Entry 
An EU climate policy that takes the goals of the Paris 
Agreement seriously would have to develop a pro-
active attitude towards CO2 removal from the atmos-
phere. On a symbolic level, this could be most clearly 
illustrated by the EU and its member states adopting 
explicitly net negative targets for the second half of 
the century. Since the planning and implementation 
periods for far-reaching economic transformations are 
very long, a start must be made in the mid-2020s to 
go beyond the current planning horizon of 2050.96 
Such a decision by the European Council, the choice 
of such a time horizon in EU climate legislation, and 
the specifics of such projection periods for the NECPs 
in the governance regulation are conceivable. Even 
if the time horizon were only slightly extended, the 
signalling effect would be enormous. An EU target of 
 
96 In 2009 the European Council decided for the first time 
on a EU emission reduction target (80–95 percent) for the 
year 2050, i.e. more than 40 years ahead. Many EU member 
states have since orientated themselves on this long-term 
target, and the EU’s interim targets for 2020 and 2030 were 
also set with reference to it, though not always consistently. 
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minus 110 percent by 2060 (supplemented by mem-
ber state targets) would make it obvious that the 
Union will have to pursue a far-reaching CDR ap-
proach.
97 It would then not only be easier to justify 
integrating CDR into EU climate policy in the 2020s, 
but also to help allay fears that the debate on CO2 
removals only serves to postpone or even defer con-
ventional measures to reduce emissions. 
An upgrading of CDR would already need to be 
reflected in a redefinition of the EU climate target for 
2030. The EU’s Nationally Determined Contribution 
(NDC) will be strengthened under the Paris Agree-
ment – the EU is being put under great pressure by 
 
97 In the modelling that accompanied the Commission’s 
draft for an EU long-term strategy, such an emission reduc-
tion pathway was already set out, see European Commission, 
In-Depth Analysis (see note 49), Table 9. Shortly before the start 
of the legislative process, several references to the net nega-
tive option were included in drafts of the Commission pro-
posal for a European climate law. In the version that was 
finally published on 4 March 2020, no such references 
remain. 
internal and international expectations98 – and its 
key legal acts on climate policy will subsequently be 
amended. As part of these processes, the CO2 remov-
als envisaged under the LULUCF Regulation could for 
the first time be fully credited towards the fulfilment 
of the EU climate target. The fact that, on the basis of 
current projections, the 2030 target could be increased 
by four to five percentage points due to this change 
alone will make it even easier for the Commission 
and the member states to take such a decision.99 
 
98 Susanne Dröge and Vijeta Rattani, After the Katowice Cli-
mate Summit. Building Blocks for the EU Climate Agenda, SWP 
Comment 9/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
February 2019). 
99 Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced 
even before her election that she would propose an initial 
increase of the EU’s emission reduction target by 10 percent-
age points by 2030 (from 40 to 50 percent) and later examine 
the extent to which 55 percent is also possible. This is neces-
sary given the strengthened 2050 target, but politically it 
is extremely ambitious, especially in the context of the eco-
nomic upheavals caused by the COVID 19 pandemic, see 
Figure 3 
 
 
Source: based on Oliver Geden, Glen P. Peters and Vivian Scott, “Targeting Carbon Dioxide Removal in the European 
Union”, Climate Policy 19 (2018), 487–4, updated with data from the European Commission, In-Depth Analysis in Support of COM(2018) 773 
(Brussels, 28 November 2018). 
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If this numerical integration of CO2 removals into 
EU climate policy were to take place transparently – 
i.e. if the CDR share in the achievement of future EU 
climate targets was always made explicit – this would 
not only have an international and intra-European 
signalling effect. It would also help to legitimise spe-
cific measures to regulate CO2 removal techniques. 
Definitions would be needed here both of the ac-
counting rules and of how to integrate rising CDR 
volumes into the key legal acts on climate policy 
(ETS, ESR, LULUCF) and their interplay. Furthermore, 
it would have to be decided how the use of already 
available biological CDR methods could be stimulated 
in the short term; how research, development and 
market introduction of technological removal meth-
ods could be promoted in Europe; and how the ex-
pansion of extensive capacities for transporting and 
geologically storing CO2 could be pushed forward 
rapidly. 
Cautious Entry 
It may seem appropriate for the EU to develop a pro-
active CO2 removal policy if it wants its claim of pur-
suing a science-based climate policy to be taken 
seriously. However, it is equally conceivable that the 
EU will take things step-by-step. It is possible that 
the CDR approach will not (yet) be convincingly inte-
grated into the dominant climate policy paradigm, 
because of extensive, and initially irresolvable, politi-
cal resistance. This could, for example, focus on reser-
vations against certain CDR methods or the (justified) 
fear that some of the most vocal proponents of the 
CDR approach will be motivated primarily by wanting 
to shift their responsibility for ambitious convention-
al emission reductions onto other actors or the distant 
future. Uncertainty as to whether the CDR quantities 
assumed in global 1.5–2°C emission scenarios are 
even remotely realistic or whether the (mandatory) 
use of CDRs will actually bring about opportunities 
for green growth in the long term could also prevent 
the EU from prioritising CDR in the coming decade. 
Faced with such resistance, the EU would initially 
refrain from an early formulation of its targets in the 
second half of the century. In this case, the ambigu-
ous standard formula already in use today, net zero by 
2050, net negative thereafter, is likely to establish itself 
at the EU level – even if individual progressive mem-
 
Geden and Schenuit, Climate Neutrality as Long-term Strategy 
(see note 48). 
ber states go beyond this and adopt national miti-
gation targets higher than 100 percent. 
In this scenario, the introduction of a CDR policy 
would be primarily incremental. Although the impor-
tance of sinks would be more strongly emphasised, 
additional initiatives would essentially be limited to 
so called ‘nature-based solutions’. The importance of 
LULUCF should be expected to increase only gradually 
in the readjustment of EU climate policy until 2030, 
not least because of political differences regarding 
accounting for ecosystem-based emission sources and 
sinks. Instead, international project-based credits (in-
cluding those from CDR projects) are likely to become 
more important again in meeting European climate 
targets. The promotion of CCS infrastructure would 
essentially remain limited to emissions from indus-
trial production processes. Although research and 
development of technological CDR methods would 
certainly be supported to a limited extent, impetus 
for their market launch would probably depend pri-
marily on breakthroughs in other regions of the 
world. Comprehensive regulatory adjustments at the 
EU level would not be necessary for the time being. 
Designing the Net Zero Target 
The setting of net zero targets all over the world will 
considerably focus the attention of climate policy-
makers on the emission structure of the respective 
target year, i.e. the relationship between residual 
emissions and CO2 removals. The debate will centre, 
on the one hand, on the question of which sectors 
should be granted residual emissions, and which 
CDR options can be used to offset them. Structurally, 
this debate will not differ from the debate on setting 
priorities for conventional emission reduction meas-
ures, which has been ongoing for more than two 
decades.100 It should lead to a “normalisation” of the 
CO2 removal approach within a few years, not least 
due to graphical representations in the form of oppos-
ing bars or bars mirrored at the zero line (see Figure 
4, p. 32). While representatives of the economic sec-
tors concerned will argue that the scenarios drawn up 
 
100 In these debates, there is a tendency to outline prob-
lems in such a way that they fit the preferred approaches to 
solving them, see Arno Simons and Jan-Peter Voß, “The Con-
cept of Instrument Constituencies: Accounting for Dynamics 
and Practices of Knowing Governance”, Policy and Society 37, 
no. 1 (2018): 14–35. 
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by the EU Commission and national governments are 
setting too low a volume for residual emissions, they 
are likely to be thought too high by NGOs. The esti-
mates of CDR volumes are likely to replicate such per-
ceptions. Both sides will support their positions with 
their own scenarios. Again, this would mirror today’s 
climate policy debate. However, the debate could 
develop into a serious problem for the political and 
public acceptance of the CO2 removal approach and 
the international reputation of EU climate policy if 
the impression is created that the (planned) use of 
CDR methods serves above all to massively weaken 
the previous (planned) emission reduction pathways. 
This impression, which would be fatal for climate 
policy, could best be countered by splitting net zero 
targets into emission reduction targets and removal 
targets, instead of simply offsetting the effects of both 
approaches. The continued primacy of conventional 
mitigation measures could thus be assured and visibly 
communicated.101 However, this does not yet resolve 
 
101 Geden, Peters and Scott, “Targeting Carbon Dioxide 
Removal in the European Union” (see note 41); McLaren et 
al., “Beyond ‘Net-Zero’” (see note 14). Should the EU decide 
to allow credits from international climate mitigation proj-
ects again, it would be worth considering only credits from 
the question of which ratio would be the most sen-
sible to aim for, especially as the answer will vary 
from one member state to another and from one sec-
tor to another. Since conventional emission reduc-
tions of 80–95 percent by 2050 have so far been 
targeted at the EU level, a consensus would probably 
lie within a corridor of 80:20 percent to 95:5 percent. 
The scenarios of the European Commission’s long-
term strategy are in the order of 90:10 percent. If the 
90 percent were to be understood as a minimum 
target for GHG reductions, any breakthroughs in CDR 
methods would not lead to a lowering of conventional 
emission reductions, but rather to net zero or net 
negative emissions being achieved earlier. With this 
approach, CO2 removals would no longer seem a 
potentially questionable element of a covert attempt 
to reduce climate policy ambitions, but as a key com-
ponent in increasing them. 
A ratio of 90:10 could be incorporated fairly 
straightforwardly into the EU’s climate policy narra-
tive. Such an integration of the CDR approach into 
 
CDR projects, especially those based on technological removal 
methods. As these have barely been used worldwide so far, 
the criterion of additionality, which was often a debatable 
issue under the Kyoto regime, could also be met more easily. 
Figure 4 
 
 
Source: European Commission, In-Depth Analysis in Support of COM(2018) 773 (Brussels, 28 November 2018), Figure 91. 
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the EU’s problem-solving paradigm could be accom-
panied by a new narrative element, whereby the 
achievement of net zero marks the point in time 
when the EU and its member states no longer use 
the atmosphere as a “dumping ground” for emis-
sions.102 This would amount to equating CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases with largely avoidable waste, 
a small part of which can be reused and an unavoid-
able remainder of which must be balanced by com-
pensatory measures. Viewing greenhouse gas emis-
sions as a waste management problem could certainly be 
persuasive,103 but only if the narrative can also point 
to a reasonably convincing practice. The EU’s contri-
bution to global problem solving could thus be de-
coupled in political and moral terms from the prac-
tice of less ambitious actors, under the motto “Ending 
our contribution to global warming”.104 In the tran-
sition from net zero to net negative emissions, the 
EU would then begin the phase of taking back the 
“waste” already released into the atmosphere. 
The Main Features of Policy Design 
A wide range of measures is conceivable for creating 
incentives for targeted CO2 removal. Dedicated regu-
latory steps at the EU level will be taken in the com-
ing decade, not least at the instigation of proactive 
member states and companies. Nevertheless, it makes 
sense not only to shape the development of an EU 
CO2 removal policy in response to bottom-up initia-
tives, but also to steer it into productive channels 
through carefully prepared policy design. For exam-
ple, it is certainly sensible to provide additional funds 
for research and development and to design innova-
tion processes;105 to take additional measures to ex-
 
102 Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Flachsland and Steffen 
Brunner, “Wer besitzt die Atmosphäre? Zur Politischen Öko-
nomie des Klimawandels”, Leviathan 39 no. 2 (2011): 201–21. 
103 Klaus S. Lackner and Christophe Jospe, “Climate Change 
Is a Waste Management Problem”, Issues in Science and Tech-
nology 33, no. 3 (2017). 
104 The UK Committee on Climate Change has successfully 
focused on the slogan “Ending the UK’s contribution to global 
warming” in its net zero study (see note 75). However, by 
doing so, the CCC downplays the dimension of historical 
emissions which, due to the longevity of CO2, will still have 
an impact on the climate even after net zero has been reached. 
105 Nemet et al., “Negative Emissions – Part 3” (see note 6); 
Max Åhman, Jon Birger Skjærseth and Per Ove Eikeland, 
“Demonstrating Climate Mitigation Technologies. An Early 
pand the sink potential in land use and forestry;106 to 
create financial incentive systems for CO2 removal;
107 
or to promote the embedding of technological CDR 
methods in global governance structures108 – yet the 
strategic frameworks for this do not exist. This applies 
first and foremost to the question of how respon-
sibilities will be distributed among member states 
and among individual sectors, but also to possible 
decisions on which CO2 removal methods are (pro-
visionally) preferred. While the European Commis-
sion recently announced plans for concrete steps (e.g. 
developing a framework for carbon removal certifica-
tion in the land sector, and payments for farmers and 
foresters), these initiatives are not being politically 
discussed, let alone implemented. 
The EU should not allow any member 
state to reach net zero more than  
10–15 years later than the average. 
If net zero at the EU level does not mean that all 
member states and sectors have to be at zero in the 
collective target year, the relationship between lead-
ers to laggards should be defined. Even if there are 
good reasons why individual countries and sectors 
reach the zero line later than the EU average, any 
deviation from the average should at least be limited 
or compensated for financially. Since it should be 
possible for all member states to bring their emissions 
to at least net zero in the long term, the EU should 
start to limit the delay, i.e. not allow any member 
state to reach net zero more than 10–15 years later 
than the average. The success of the net zero project 
must not be jeopardised by the fact that citizens in 
the pioneering European states are getting the im-
pression that they are – to continue the waste 
management metaphor – permanently responsible 
for cleaning up the waste of other EU member states. 
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nology Plan (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). 
106 Gert-Jan Nabuurs et al., “By 2050 the Mitigation Effects 
of EU Forests Could Nearly Double through Climate Smart 
Forestry”, Forests 8, no. 484 (2017): 1–14. 
107 Platt, Workman and Hall, “A Novel Approach” 
(see note 77). 
108 Asbjørn Torvanger, “Governance of Bio-energy with 
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS): Accounting, Reward-
ing, and the Paris Agreement”, Climate Policy 19, no 3 (2019): 
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As for the relationship between sectors, however, it 
will not be possible in the foreseeable future to estab-
lish a similar obligation for all laggards. While the 
steel, cement and aviation industries are likely to be 
primarily concerned in the long term with the cost 
level of technical decarbonisation options like ‘green 
hydrogen’ (whose marketability will depend not least 
on the level of CO2 pricing and other support meas-
ures),109 there are technical feasibility limits in agri-
culture, in particular.110 Here, care must be taken 
to ensure that sectors which in principle must be 
allowed residual emissions are themselves responsible 
for the corresponding CO2 removals, regardless of 
whether they purchase certificates from other sectors 
(e.g. electricity or forestry) or invest directly in CO2 
removal methods, which is particularly appropriate 
in the agricultural sector.111 
The allocation of responsibilities must be organised 
and regulated via the established pillars of emissions 
trading, member state effort sharing (for non-ETS sec-
tors such as transport, buildings and agriculture), and 
land use/forestry. While emissions trading is harmo-
nised across Europe and controlled by a single reduc-
tion factor for certificates and the resulting prices, the 
other two pillars still have politically negotiated tar-
gets that can differ substantially across member states. 
There is currently only limited flexibility between the 
three pillars, and the (political and financial) abate-
ment costs for an additional tonne of CO2 vary widely. 
 
109 Davis et al., “Net-zero Emissions Energy Systems” 
(see note 39); Yoichi Kaya, Mitsutsune Yamaguchi and Oliver 
Geden, “Towards Net Zero CO2 Emissions without Relying 
on Massive Carbon Dioxide Removal”, Sustainability Science 14, 
no. 6 (2019): 1739–43; Bataille, “Physical and Policy Path-
ways to Net-zero Emissions Industry” (see note 39). 
110 Given current production structures and consumption 
patterns, this especially applies to methane emissions from 
livestock. The extent to which far-reaching changes can be 
expected in this area cannot be predicted. Trying to bring 
about a significant reduction in meat consumption through 
climate policy measures is likely to reach the limits of fea-
sibility, see Jessica Jewell and Aleh Cherp, “On the Political 
Feasibility of Climate Change Mitigation Pathways: Is It Too 
Late to Keep Warming Below 1.5°C?” WIREs Climate Change 
10, no. e621 (2019). 
111 E.g. by processes such as increased carbon sequestra-
tion in soils, biochar burial, or the application of minerals 
for enhanced weathering, see Pete Smith et al., “Land-
Management Options for Greenhouse Gas Removal and Their 
Impacts on Ecosystem Services and the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals”, Annual Review of Environment and Resources 44, 
no. 1 (2019): 255–86. 
If the EU does not want to move to emissions trading 
for nearly all sectors in the long term – which can-
not be in the political interest of the member states 
lagging behind as long as they are able to negotiate 
advantageous national targets – it will sooner or 
later have to define which pillars (and thus, which 
groups of actors) will primarily be in charge of organ-
ising CO2 removals from the atmosphere. 
In the short term, such a complex decision could 
be postponed if the EU relied exclusively on expand-
ing LULUCF sinks, possibly with more stringent 
national minimum targets as early as 2030. Such a 
preference for biological sinks could reasonably be 
justified with the argument that CDR methods al-
ready in use are ready for application (afforestation, 
restoring ecosystems, increased sequestration of car-
bon in soils), and also with reference to the presum-
ably higher levels of public acceptance for these meth-
ods compared to technological sinks – the recent 
announcements by the Commission point towards 
this development.112 In the medium term, however, 
the EU will not be able to avoid integrating techno-
logical sinks into its climate policy. Based on the 
current state of the debate and the first demonstra-
tion plants in individual member states, these will 
probably mainly involve BECCS and DACCS, but pos-
sibly also enhanced weathering of mineral rocks. Any 
preferences could be governed by differentiating a 
CO2 removal target into specific sub-targets for eco-
system-based and technological processes. Reserva-
tions against individual CDR methods need not result 
in explicit exclusions. It would be enough not to 
define accounting rules for them.113 
For many observers – especially those who are not 
primarily concerned with climate policy – it may 
 
112 The acceptance of individual CDR options is likely to 
vary significantly between member states or even between 
regions. 
113 It is already possible to operate BECCS plants, for 
example to produce electricity. However, under the current 
ETS rules, an operator would receive no compensation for 
the CO2 removed from the atmosphere. To make this pos-
sible, new crediting rules would have to be established, 
which differentiate not only between individual BECCS 
processes, but also between the specific life-cycle emissions 
of the biomass used in each case. The latter differ consider-
ably depending on whether the biomass is grown and im-
ported for energy purposes or is a residue from domestic 
forestry, see Mathilde Fajardy et al., BECCS Deployment: A 
Reality Check, Briefing paper no. 28 (London: Grantham Insti-
tute, January 2019). 
 The Main Features of Policy Design 
 SWP Berlin 
 Unconventional Mitigation 
 June 2020 
 35 
seem audacious to start thinking now about what 
emissions pathway the EU should follow after 2050. 
However, it makes a significant difference when look-
ing at the challenge of integrating CDR today, because 
it influences the decision between a proactive and a 
cautious pathway. Since CO2 sequestration in soils 
and forests is associated with natural saturation ef-
fects, it cannot simply be assumed that a biological 
sink performance achieved in 2050 can be repeated in 
each subsequent year. Even if the EU “only” wanted 
to achieve net zero emissions in the long term, it is 
unlikely that the additional land required for this 
purpose would be available throughout the second 
half of the century. Moreover, along with rising tem-
peratures comes a risk that the capacity of ecosystems 
to act as a CO2 sink will decline. If Europe wants to 
live up to its responsibility for achieving global cli-
mate targets and therefore pursue an ambitious net 
negative strategy in the long term, there will be no 
way around the increased use of more easily scalable 
technological CDR methods and permanent geologi-
cal CO2 storage.
114 While climate policymakers and 
public officials should always take this into account 
when planning to set up and expand CO2 removals, 
they must also avoid overburdening the public and 
non-specialist politicians with extremely ambitious 
net negative targets, which would mean challenging 
the largely successful problem-solving paradigm. The 
straightforward necessity of making CO2 removal an 
integral part of EU climate policy as part of a net zero 
strategy offers an opportunity for proceeding sequen-
tially.115 The first priority should be to invest more in 
research and development of CO2 removal methods, 
to gain more practical experience of their use, and to 
“normalise” CDR discursively and practically. Only if 
the EU and its member states actually succeed in con-
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land requirements associated with afforestation measures, 
the question of the land footprint of alternative removal meth-
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Fajardy, Solene Chiquier and Niall Mac Dowell, “Investigat-
ing the BECCS Resource Nexus: Delivering Sustainable Nega-
tive Emissions”, Energy & Environmental Science 11 (2018): 
3408–30. 
115 Geden, “An Actionable Climate Target” (see note 10); 
Joeri Rogelj et al., “A New Scenario Logic for the Paris Agree-
ment Long-Term Temperature Goal”, Nature 573 (2019): 
357–63. 
vincingly combining conventional emission reduc-
tions and unconventional CO2 removals on the road 
to net zero will Europeans one day dare to pursue an 
ambitious net negative strategy as a second step, i.e. 
to expand CO2 removals to an extent not yet imagi-
nable. 
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